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ABSTRACT
The price of crude oil in the futures markets has oscillated wildly during
the past five years.  Although these price swings may partly be a result of in-
sufficient supply meeting large demand for oil, economic data demonstrate
that market fundamentals have in fact remained in equilibrium.  An over-
whelming number of market participants, financial analysts, and academics
have instead shown that unregulated excessive speculation in the oil futures
markets is to blame.  Such excessive speculation is a result of the financializa-
tion of commodities, which has exacerbated price swings in oil because the
speculative upward betting causes artificially high prices that do not reflect
actual demand.  In order to prevent unstable prices in oil and other commodi-
ties, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and other agen-
cies must strongly enforce measures such as position limits and anti-
manipulation rules as directed by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act.  Legislative bans on derivative-based gambling on
crude oil prices will also help in this regard.  These actions will help prevent
radically high prices in oil and other commodities and restore those markets to
pricing determined by market fundamentals, which will in turn prevent further
volatility in crude oil prices that threatens the fragile economic recovery of the
United States and the rest of the world.
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INTRODUCTION
West Texas Intermediate (“WTI”) is a grade of crude oil that
serves as the benchmark for oil pricing in the United States and is the
underlying commodity for oil futures contracts on the New York Mer-
cantile Exchange (“NYMEX”).1  The price of WTI determines the
price of gasoline and other derivative products such as heating oil,2
and this price has oscillated wildly during the past five years.  The
WTI spot price (the price for immediate delivery)3 was approximately
$70 per barrel in July 2007, after which it reached a record high of
$147 in July 2008 before falling to a record low of $30 in December
2008.4  The price increased to $69 at the end of July 2009 and reached
1 U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK SUPPLEMENT: BRENT
CRUDE OIL SPOT PRICE FORECAST 1 (2012), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/special/pdf/2012_
sp_02.pdf.  Brent crude oil serves as the benchmark for oil pricing in Europe. Id.
2 See id.
3 Glossary, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (last visited Jan. 6, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/
tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=S.
4 Rebekah Kebede, Oil Hits Record Above $147, REUTERS (July 11, 2008, 3:58 PM), http:/
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$110 in April 2011, then decreased to approximately$75 in October
2011, and finally increased again to $105 in the beginning of April
2012.5  Even though there was no shutoff of the U.S. supply of foreign
oil, the volatility in oil prices between 2007 and 2012 has been expo-
nentially greater than the oil shocks following the 1973 Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”) oil embargo, the 1979
Iranian Revolution, and the 1990–91 Persian Gulf War.6  Indeed,
OPEC has actually increased production over this five-year period to
mitigate the wild volatility in crude oil prices.7  Furthermore, the fun-
damentals of supply and demand have not only generally remained in
equilibrium over the last five years;8 the United States has also be-
come a net exporter of petroleum products for the first time in more
than sixty years.9
The volatility in crude oil prices and the attendant rise in gasoline
prices threaten the fragile economic recovery in the United States and
the rest of the world, raising the specter of a renewed recession with a
substantial further increase in unemployment.10  For example, the in-
/www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/11/us-markets-oil-idUST14048520080711; Petroleum & Other
Liquids: Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price FOB, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (last visited Jan. 4,
2013), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=RWTC&f=D [hereinafter
Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA].
5 Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
6 DAVID FRENK, BETTER MARKETS, INC., REVIEW OF IRWIN AND SANDERS 2010 OECD
REPORTS 3 (2010).
7 See Clifford Krauss, OPEC Opts to Increase its Level of Output, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
2011, at B10.
8 See Ali Naimi, Saudi Arabia Will Act to Lower Soaring Oil Prices, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 28,
2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9e1ccb48-781c-11e1-b237-00144feab49a.html#axzz215
C3ltN8.
9 See Gas Prices and Speculation (C-SPAN broadcast Apr. 4, 2012), available at http://
www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/2478294 [hereinafter C-SPAN Video]; see also Barbara Powell, U.S.
Was Net Oil-Product Exporter for First Time Since 1949, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 29, 2012, 5:52 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-29/u-s-was-net-oil-product-exporter-in-2011.html.
10 Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, has stated
that rising energy prices are a greater threat to the worldwide economy than the European sov-
ereign debt crisis.  Guy Chazan, Naimi Calls High Oil Prices ‘Unjustified’, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 20,
2012, 4:01 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f9f8eb00-729e-11e1-9be9-00144feab49a.html#axzz
282dappup [hereinafter Chazan, Prices Unjustified]; see also MARK COOPER, EXCESSIVE SPECU-
LATION AND OIL PRICE SHOCK RECESSIONS: A CASE OF WALL STREET “DE´JA` VU ALL OVER
AGAIN” 3–5 (2011), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/SpeculationReportOctober13.pdf; James
D. Hamilton, Historical Oil Shocks, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MAJOR EVENTS IN ECO-
NOMIC HISTORY 239, 239 (Randall E. Parker & Robert Whaples eds., 2013) (detailing the role oil
shocks play as major contributors to recessions); Javier Blas, Soaring Crude Price Threatens Re-
covery, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2012, 9:33 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c198a52a-5f02-11e1-
a04d-00144feabdc0.html#axzz282dappup; Guy Chazan, Oil’s Rise Seen As Threat to Growth,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2011, at C10; High Oil Prices Threaten Global Economy, IEA Warns,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 14, 2011, 4:37 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/dec/14/iea-high-
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creased costs of gasoline, a key derivative of crude oil, saps economic
demand for consumer goods because consumers spend more on gas
and thus have less money to purchase other necessities and consumer
items.11  This, in turn, leads to fewer jobs to produce and distribute
such goods.  Moreover, small businesses are especially vulnerable to
sustained high gas prices because of their limited capital resources.12
In short, worldwide changes in crude oil market fundamentals (or
perhaps even expectations about threatened disruptions to supply)
may be part of the reason for the recent fluctuations in oil prices, but
they cannot fully explain the radical oil price oscillations in recent
years, especially because global supply has generally met global de-
mand during this time.  The recent financialization of crude oil futures
and other commodity staples derivatives markets (i.e., betting on the
upward direction of these prices) has exacerbated these price swings,
causing the prices of oil and other commodities to remain artificially
high.13  Ending this excessive speculation in commodity futures mar-
kets will restore stability to crude oil pricing and facilitate economic
oil-prices-global-economy; Caroline Salas & Steve Matthews, Fisher, Lockhart Say Rising Oil
Prices Threaten U.S. Economic Growth, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 18, 2011, 2:20 PM), http://.bloom
berg.com/news/2011-04-18/fed-s-fisher-lockhart-say-rising-oil-prices-threaten-growth.html (quot-
ing Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas President Richard Fisher: “‘[Rising oil prices are] a double
whammy’ as ‘[they] slow[ ] down our economy’ and ‘add[ ] to inflationary pressures.’”).
11 The average household in 2011 spent an estimated $600 more on gasoline than it would
have if excessive speculation had not distorted oil prices. COOPER, supra note 10, at 3.  In other
words, the money Americans saved from the congressional payroll tax cut in 2012 goes straight
to paying for gas. GENE GUILFORD, INDEP. CONN. PETROL. ASS’N & EDUC. FOUND., CONNECT
THE DOTS BETWEEN WALL STREET AND THE LOCAL GAS PUMP (2012), http://www.scribd.com/
doc/94819405/Gene-Guilford-Briefing.
Speculation can drive commodities prices too low as well, which would also threaten the
world economy. See Gordon Brown & Nicolas Sarkozy, Op-Ed, We Must Address Oil-Market
Volatility, WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124699813615707481.html
(“[W]e as consumers must recognize that abnormally low oil prices, while giving short-term ben-
efits, do long-term damage.  They diminish incentives to invest, not only in oil production but
also, in our own countries, in energy savings and carbon-free alternatives.”); Robert Rapier,
Cutting Through the Rhetoric on Speculators and Oil Prices, CONSUMER ENERGY REP. (Apr. 16,
2012), http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/2012/04/16/cutting-through-the-rhetoric-on-specu-
lators-and-oil-prices/ (“Speculation can drive prices in either direction.”).
12 COOPER, supra note 10, at 1, 5; see also Energy Speculation: Is Greater Regulation Neces-
sary to Stop Price Manipulation? (Part II): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investi-
gations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 110th Cong. 164–75 (2008) [hereinafter
Guilford Statement] (statement of Eugene A. Guilford, Jr., Exec. Dir. & CEO, Indep. Conn.
Petrol. Ass’n) (describing, inter alia, the difficulties of consumers and commercial businesses
caused by excessively high oil prices).
13 See, e.g., STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE S. COMM. ON
HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG., EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE
WHEAT MARKET 101–02, 146 n.243 (Comm. Print 2009) [hereinafter WHEAT REPORT].
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growth by allowing commodity producers and consumers to rely on
futures markets to hedge their risks effectively.14  Strong enforcement
of rigorous position limits and anti-manipulation rules by the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) as directed by the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”),15 as well as enforcement of other recent anti-manip-
ulation legislation by a variety of other agencies, will curb excessive
speculation in the commodities markets.16  Moreover, efforts by the
federal and state governments to ban gambling on crude oil prices
may have an even more direct effect on lowering the cost of these
products to consumers.17  Decreasing excessive speculation will conse-
quently help prevent unnecessarily high prices in oil and other com-
modities and restore those markets to pricing determined by classic
market fundamentals.  This will in turn help prevent another global
recession or worse.
I. EXCESSIVE SPECULATION SIGNIFICANTLY IMPACTS OIL PRICES
The principal functions of commodity futures markets are to
serve as a venue for commercial producers and consumers to hedge
against price risks and to provide market participants with guidance
14 Excessive speculation has also caused volatility in other futures markets, including food
staple commodities. See, e.g., id. at 38–40.  The volatility in futures prices for food staples has led
to increased hunger and malnutrition throughout the world. See Letter from Food Speculation
Coal. to President Barack Obama (Mar. 24, 2009), available at http://www.grassrootsonline.org/
news/articles/food-speculation-coalition-letter-president-obama (letter from 184 human rights
and hunger relief organizations discussing the harmful impact of excessive speculation in the
food commodities markets on hundreds of millions of people around the world); Food & Agric.
Org. of the United Nations, Experts Eye Commodities Speculation, Food Price Swings, FAO
(July 6, 2012), http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/150900/icode/ (quoting President Leonel
Ferna´ndez Reyna of the Dominican Republic: “Financial speculation is exacerbating market
fluctuations and this exacerbation is generating uncertainty—this uncontrolled, unregulated ex-
acerbation is provoking a dramatic impact on countries that are net food importers . . . . We are
not talking about an abstract concept here, we are talking about something that is having a
devastating, dramatic and brutal impact on the lives of people.”).  Recognizing the destructive
social impact that they have on needlessly raising the price of commodity staples, many swaps
dealers have abandoned all or some of these bets.  Javier Blas, Banks Withdraw Food Commod-
ity Funds, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012, 10:06PM), http://.ft.com///0/-e62f-11e1-ac5f-00144feab49a.
html#axzz23oxFzBVk.
15 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
16 See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,398–400 (July
14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 180).
17 See, e.g., WHEAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 52 n.76 (discussing Congress’s decision in
1958 to prohibit onion futures to prevent wild fluctuations in the price of onions).
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on fair spot prices.18  Because these markets have traditionally oper-
ated in accordance with the fundamentals of supply and demand, they
serve as “price discovery” mechanisms.19  That is, the tension between
producers and consumers in ensuring fair prices through the futures
markets has caused these markets to determine the prices at which the
underlying commodities are sold on the spot market.20  For example,
when a producer of oil sells oil, the producer looks to the futures mar-
ket price to determine the sale price of the actual commodity.  How-
ever, as shown below, when these markets are overrun by excessive
speculation—i.e., too many participants betting on price direction
(rather than worrying about fair pricing in commercial sales) without
ever taking possession of crude oil—the futures price becomes un-
moored from market fundamentals.21  The excessive betting on price
direction in these markets has caused much volatility in the price of oil
over the last five years.22
A. The Role of Futures Markets
Unlike the securities and bond markets, futures markets are not
designed to raise capital for, or provide lending to, business interests.23
The entire rationale of these markets is to provide vehicles for com-
mercial producers and consumers to insure against future unpredict-
able volatility in pricing.24  Indeed, the classic example of a futures
contract begins with the sowing farmer who fears the price of his crop
will decline by harvest time such that he incurs significant losses.  To
hedge against that risk, the farmer sells a contract in the futures mar-
ket that guarantees delivery at a later date for a price that will likely
protect the farmer against the feared drop in price.  Likewise, a con-
sumer who fears a later rise in prices may purchase that futures con-
tract, allowing the consumer to receive the crop at a later date for a
price that will likely protect the consumer against the feared price
increase.25
18 See id. at 52–53.
19 See, e.g., id. at 142.
20 See id. at 47, 51, 157.
21 See, e.g., id. at 12.
22 See id. at 101–02; supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
23 See, e.g., Jill Treanor, Banks Urged to Raise More Capital from Markets Amid Eurozone
Crisis, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2012, 10:03 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/sep/
27/banks-raise-capital-markets-eurozone.
24 See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 14–15.
25 For descriptions and examples of how commercial producers and consumers can hedge
against price risk through the commodity futures markets, see NICK BATTLEY, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO COMMODITY FUTURES AND OPTIONS 5–12 (2d ed. 1995); The Economic Purpose of
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The tension between commercial producers attempting to obtain
a reasonably high price and consumers trying to achieve a fair low
price for the sale or purchase of physical commodities through the
public transparent hedging process anchors these price discovery fu-
tures markets to economic fundamentals.26  It also helps ensure fair
market prices for the ultimate consumers of these commodities—i.e.,
the public.  As a result of the tension between consumers and produc-
ers seeking fair prices, these markets provide price discovery in the
“spot” (or “cash”) markets.27  Those selling or buying commodities in
the spot markets rely almost exclusively on futures prices to deter-
mine how much to charge or pay for the delivery of a commodity.28
Since the creation of futures markets in the agricultural context
many decades ago, it has been widely understood that without proper
regulation, these markets are prone to distortion in the economic fun-
damentals of price discovery through excessive speculation—in other
words, paying unnecessarily high or low prices due to the presence of
too many participants in these markets who merely bet on the direc-
tion of commodity prices without ever possessing the underlying com-
modity.29  As one disgruntled farmer lamented to the House
Agriculture Committee in 1892: “[T]he man who managed or sold or
owned those immense wheat fields has not as much to say with regard
to the price of the wheat that some young fellow who stands howling
around the Chicago wheat pit could actually sell in a day.”30
Futures Markets and How They Work, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://
www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/economicpurpose (last visited Jan. 11,
2012) [hereinafter Economic Purpose].
26 See, e.g., Anne Peck, The Economic Role of Traditional Commodity Futures Markets, in
FUTURES MARKETS: THEIR ECONOMIC ROLE 73–76 (Anne E. Peck ed., 1985) (discussing the
benefits of futures markets to both producers and consumers of commodities); see also 7 U.S.C.
§ 5(a) (2006) (stating that derivatives transactions subject to the Commodity Exchange Act are
“affected with a national public interest by providing a means for managing and assuming price
risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing information through trading in liquid, fair and
financially secure trading facilities”).
27 See Economic Purpose, supra note 25.  A spot contract is “a contract for immediate
delivery of the commodity.” Id.
28 See, e.g., PLATTS, PLATTS OIL PRICING AND MOC METHODOLOGY EXPLAINED 3 (2010),
http://.platts.com/IM.Platts.Content/InsightAnalysis/IndustrySolutionPapers/moc.pdf.
29 See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 2; Economic Purpose, supra note 25.  Some com-
mentators go as far as to say that excessive speculation not only distorts, but also destroys, the
price discovery function of the market.  Testimony of Michael W. Masters, Managing Member/
Portfolio Manager, Masters Capital Mgmt., LLC, Before the Commodities Futures Trading As-
sociation 17 (Mar. 25, 2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/doc-
uments/file/metalmarkets032510_masters.pdf [hereinafter Masters 2010 Testimony].
30 Jonathan Ira Levy, Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the Problem of Com-
modity Exchange in the United States, 1875-1905, 111 AM. HIST. REV. 307, 307 (2006) (quoting
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B. The History of Excessive Speculation in the Oil Futures Markets
Speculators have a role to play in the hedging function because
they ensure that the futures markets have sufficient liquidity31—that
is, the commodity producer and consumer will always have enough
available market participants to close out a contract when needed.32
In other words, speculators are often needed to ensure that physical
hedgers have a ready market to buy or sell their futures contracts,
even when actual demand for futures contracts among other commer-
cial hedgers is low.  However, when speculation becomes excessive—
i.e., when there is more speculation than necessary to provide com-
mercial hedgers with liquidity—the market becomes unmoored from
the competing tensions between consumers and producers described
above.33  Congress passed the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”)34
of 1936 in order to prevent these effects through regulation.35
The CEA, enacted in 1936 in a format the template of which sur-
vives today, authorizes federal commodity regulators to ban excessive
speculation in these markets.36  As a report from the House Agricul-
ture Committee commented in 1935:
The fundamental purpose of the [Commodity Exchange Act]
is to insure [sic] fair practice and honest dealing on the com-
modity exchanges and to provide a measure of control over
those forms of speculative activity which too often demoral-
ize the markets to the injury of producers and consumers and
the exchanges themselves.37
Thus, a chief aim of the CEA was to protect farmers and other futures
market participants from the harm that results from excessive specula-
Fictitious Dealings in Agricultural Products: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 52d Cong.
186 (1892) (statement of Charles Pillsbury)) (internal quotations omitted).
31 See Economic Purpose, supra note 25.
32 See 1 PHILLIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION
§ 1.03[4] (2004) (differentiating among speculating, investing, and hedging); id. § 1.03[6] (“Yet it
is highly unlikely that the commercial world’s need for futures contracts at any given time will be
exactly balanced between long and short contracts.  Commodity investors are admitted access to
these markets in order to fill the demand for futures contracts even when no commercial firm
has an interest in doing so . . . .”); see also BP N. Am. Petrol. v. Solar ST, 250 F.3d 307, 311 n.3
(5th Cir. 2001) (defining speculators and hedgers).
33 See, e.g., WHEAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 12.
34 Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), Pub. L. No. 74-675, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–17 (2006)).
35 Id. sec. 5, § 4a, 49 Stat. at 1492 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a) (2006)).
36 See id.
37 H.R. REP. NO. 74-421, at 1 (1935) (emphasis added).
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tive activity, which leads to unreasonable market prices for
commodities.
When President Roosevelt introduced what became the CEA in
1934, he said: “[I]t should be our national policy to restrict, as far as
possible, the use of these exchanges for purely speculative opera-
tions.”38  Accordingly, section 5 of the CEA grants the CFTC the au-
thority to set maximum position limits:39
Excessive speculation in any commodity . . . causing sudden
or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the
price of such commodity, is an undue and unnecessary bur-
den on interstate commerce in such commodity.  For the pur-
pose of diminishing, eliminating, or preventing such burden,
the commission shall . . . fix such limits on the amount of
trading . . . [relating to] such commodity . . . as the commis-
sion finds . . . necessary to diminish, eliminate, or prevent
such burden.40
These position limits were historically designed to ensure enough
speculation to maintain liquidity in the commodities futures markets
could take place, while preventing the unmooring of market funda-
mentals due to excessive speculation.41
The CEA allows exemptions from position limits for businesses
to “hedge their legitimate anticipated business needs.”42  In other
words, businesses are exempt from position limits if they need to enter
the futures market in order to protect themselves against adverse
movement in the prices of commodities that they need to buy or sell.43
Examples include farmers who need to hedge against a future fall in
prices for their crops and airlines that need to hedge against future
increases in the price of fuel.44
38 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress Recommending a Securities Ex-
change Commission (Feb. 9, 1934), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=14805 (emphasis added).
39 CEA sec. 5, § 4a(1), 49 Stat. at 1492 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6a(1)).  The CFTC defines a
“speculative position limit” as: “The maximum position . . . in one commodity future (or option)
or in all futures (or options) of one commodity combined that may be held or controlled by one
person (other than a person eligible for a hedge exemption) . . . .” CFTC Glossary: A Guide to
the Language of the Futures Industry, COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://.cftc.gov///
/index.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2013) [hereinafter CFTC Glossary].
40 CEA sec. 5, § 4a(1), 49 Stat. at 1492 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6a(1))(emphasis added).  For
a discussion of the CFTC’s enforcement of position limits in other agricultural commodities and
the process of such enforcement, see 1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 32, at § 2.04[9].
41 H.R. REP. NO. 74-421, at 1–3.
42 CEA sec. 5, § 4c, 49 Stat. at 1492 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c).
43 See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 72–73.
44 See, e.g., Testimony of Congressman Bart Stupak, U.S. House of Representatives,
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In 1991, however, the CFTC authorized a “bona fide hedging”
exemption to the swap dealer J. Aron and Company, which was
owned by Goldman Sachs.45  This company had “no physical commod-
ity exposure, and therefore no legitimate anticipated business need”
for purposes of the exemption.46  Instead, J. Aron provided swaps bets
to its customers, which gave them the ability to bet on commodity
price direction without taking possession of those commodities.47  J.
Aron received this bona fide hedging exemption presumably on the
theory that in order to lay off risks from these swaps bets, it had a
“commercial” need to buy as many futures contracts as it could to
offset its exposure to losses on those bets.48  Without this exemption,
J. Aron could not operate a de facto “casino” and instead would have
had to limit its customers’ bets to the restrictions of the position limits.
Since 1991, the CFTC has granted staff exemptions to fifteen dif-
ferent investment banks,49 even though these swaps dealer “casinos”
had no legitimate anticipated commercial or business need of the na-
ture intended by President Roosevelt and Congress in 1936.50  These
large institutions argued that they needed to hedge their bets in the
then-unregulated swaps market by investing in futures contracts, and
so they were secretly and without public notice classified by the CFTC
staff as “commercial traders.”51
The resulting “swaps loophole” has led swaps dealers, generally
large financial institutions, to take positions in the oil futures and
other commodity staples markets that are larger than they would have
been if the swaps dealers had merely bought or sold futures contracts,
which are subject to speculative position limits.52  These larger posi-
tions lay off the betting risk assumed by large financial institutions
from sales of commodity index swaps,53 exchange traded funds,54 and
Before the Commodities Futures Trading Commission Hearing on Energy Position Limits and
Hedge Exemptions 3 (July 28, 2009), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@news-
room/documents/file/hearing072809_stupak.pdf.
45 Id. at 5.
46 Id.
47 See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 75.
48 See id.
49 Testimony of Congressman Bart Stupak, supra note 44, at 5.
50 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, supra note 38.
51 See Kevin G. Hall & Robert A. Rankin, Speculation Explains More About Oil Prices
than Anything Else, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (May 13, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/
2011/05/13//-more-about.html.
52 See KENNETH B. MEDLOCK III & AMY MYERS JAFFE, WHO IS IN THE OIL FUTURES
MARKET AND HOW HAS IT CHANGED? 9 (2009).
53 A commodity index swap is a “swap whose cash flows are intended to replicate a com-
modity index.” CFTC Glossary, supra note 39.  In other words, the returns of a commodity
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exchange traded notes,55 all of which allow investors to bet passively
on the direction of a synthetic “basket” of energy and food commodi-
ties that are heavily weighted toward crude oil.56  To make these bets,
the customers do not have to, and, in fact, most often do not, own the
underlying commodities on which they bet.57
Passive investors, who in the aggregate account for the largest
share of outstanding commodities futures contracts, include not only
banks, but also other institutional investors such as pension funds, en-
dowment funds, and sovereign wealth funds, as well as wealthy indi-
vidual speculators.58  The swaps vehicles and offsetting bets made by
index swap are “based upon the performance of a specified commodity index . . . . If the value of
the commodity index increases, the value of the swap to the purchaser will increase by a corre-
sponding amount.” WHEAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 83.
54 An exchange traded fund (“ETF”) is an “investment vehicle holding a commodity or
other asset that issues shares that are traded like a stock on a securities exchange.” CFTC Glos-
sary, supra note 39.  These shares “hold the various futures contracts whose values are used to
compute the index value.” WHEAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 86.
55 An exchange traded note (“ETN”) is “designed and sold by banks and other financial
institutions to permit retail investors to purchase shares of a debt security whose price is linked
to that of a commodity index.  Upon maturation of the note, the issuer of the ETN promises to
pay the holder of each share of the note the value of . . . [the] commodity index.” WHEAT
REPORT, supra note 13, at 86.
56 See Ke Tang & Wei Xiong, Index Investment and Financialization of Commodities, 68
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 54, 72 (2012) (“As a result of the financialization process, the price of an
individual commodity is no longer determined solely by its supply and demand.  Instead, prices
are also determined by the aggregate risk appetite for financial assets and the investment behav-
ior of diversified commodity index investors.”); Testimony of Michael W. Masters, Managing
Member/Portfolio Manager, Masters Capital Mgmt., LLC, Before the Commodities Futures
Trading Association 24–26 (Aug. 5, 2009), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/
@newsroom/documents/file/hearing080509_masters.pdf [hereinafter Masters 2009 Testimony];
see also id. at 11–12 (describing how investment banks created commodity investment vehicles
that only allowed investors to take long positions); Cyrus Sanati, Congress Girds for a Fight on
Oil Trading, CNNMONEY (Mar. 26, 2012, 11:48 AM), http://.fortune.cnn.com//03/26/congress-oil-
trading/ (“A lot of the speculative money comes from passive investment vehicles, like ETFs and
ETNs run by investment management firms like PIMCO.  Since those passive funds have a long
bias, they tend to skew the market by dampening downswings in the market while augmenting
run-ups.”).
57 See, e.g., Futures and Options 101, ALTAVEST, http://www.altavest.com//.aspx (last vis-
ited Jan. 13, 2013) (“When trading futures, you never actually buy or sell anything tangible; you
are just contracting to do so at a future date.  You are merely taking a buying or selling position
as a speculator, expecting to profit from rising or falling prices.  You have no intention of making
or taking delivery of the commodity you are trading, your only goal is to buy low and sell high,
or vice-versa.”).  In contrast, speculative investors will soon be able to buy physical copper and
keep it off the market to raise prices, even though they have no intention of making productive
use of the commodity. See Lina Khan, JP Morgan Gets a Big Holiday Gift from the SEC, NEW
REPUBLIC (Dec. 31, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/blog/plank/111490/jp-morgan-gets-big-
holiday-gift-the-sec#.
58 Financial Speculation in Commodity Markets: Are Institutional Investors and Hedge
Funds Contributing to Food and Energy Price Inflation?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Home-
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passive investors are now informally recognized as their own class of
assets for investment portfolios.59  The weight of their record volume
of long investments in the oil futures markets60 helps explain the fact
land Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 40 (2008) (statement of Michael W. Masters,
Managing Member/Portfolio Manager, Masters Capital Mgmt., LLC); WHEAT REPORT, supra
note 13, at 76, 79 (noting that investments in commodity indexes are “purchased mainly by finan-
cial institutions, insurance companies, pension funds, foundations, hedge funds, and wealthy in-
dividuals”); Energy Market Manipulation and Federal Enforcement Regimes: Hearing on S.R. 253
Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transport. 2-3 (2008) (testimony of George Soros,
Chairman, Soros Fund Management), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/public/
?a=Files.Serve&File_id=80aebf28-67b8-4c5b-84cd-574291807e98. [hereinafter Soros Testimony]
(explaining the role of institutional investors in inflating the oil price bubble); DANIEL YERGIN,
THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 170 (2011)
(referring to the investment in commodities as the “massive passives”).  Leading up to the re-
cord high oil prices in 2008, CalPERS (California’s main public-employee pension fund) had
invested $1 billion in commodity index funds believing that “in the coming decades natural re-
sources are going to be where the action is.”  Steven Mufson, Oil Price Defies Easy Calculation,
WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2008, at D1.  In 2012, the amount that CalPERS invested in such assets
increased to $3.6 billion. See John Kemp, CalPERS Fails to Make Money in Commodities,
REUTERS (July 23, 2012, 6:10 AM), http://.reuters.com//2012/07/23/column-kemp-commodities-
pensions-idUSL6E8IN6IK20120723.
59 See DANIEL O’SULLIVAN, PETROMANIA: BLACK GOLD, PAPER BARRELS AND OIL
PRICE BUBBLES 109–10 (2009) (explaining the process by which oil futures became investment
vehicles and the effect of this process on increasing oil prices); ROBERT POLLIN & JAMES
HEINTZ, HOW WALL STREET SPECULATION IS DRIVING UP GASOLINE PRICES TODAY 3 (2011)
(describing “energy futures contracts as an alternative to holding stocks, bonds, or other types of
derivatives assets, such as mortgage-backed securities”); Gary Gorton & K. Geert Rouwenhorst,
Facts and Fantasies About Commodity Futures, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 47, 60 (2006) (“Commodity
futures returns have been especially effective in providing diversification for stock and bond
portfolios.”); see also Giulio Cifarelli & Giovanna Paladino, Oil Price Dynamics and Speculation:
A Multivariate Financial Approach, 32 ENERGY ECON. 363, 364 (2010) (discussing investment
strategies that involve purchasing commodities to diversify a portfolio when a trader is bearish
on stocks).
Interestingly, some researchers have categorized commodities such as oil as speculative in-
struments based on comparisons to gold.  Gold is widely known as a highly speculative commod-
ity with a price driven by factors other than demand, and the relationship between the prices of
gold and oil were surprisingly close for decades before oil prices started growing at a much
higher rate than gold prices in 2002. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUT-
LOOK: MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA 28 (2008); MOHSIN S. KHAN, PETERSON INST. FOR
INT’L ECON., THE 2008 OIL PRICE “BUBBLE” 5 (2009);; see also John Baffes & Tassos Haniotis,
Placing the 2006/08 Commodity Price Boom into Perspective 6 (The World Bank Development
Prospects Group Policy Research Working Paper No. 5371, 2010), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/servlet///////_20100721110120/Rendered/PDF/WPS5371.pdf (explaining that
the “financialization of commodities” was “a role typically reserved for gold” in the past (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
60 Silla Brush, Energy Speculation at Highest Levels on Record, CFTC’s Bart Chilton Says,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 15, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-15/hedge-
fund-energy-speculation-highest-on-record-cftc-s-bart-chilton-says.html (“Hedge funds and
other speculators have increased their positions in energy markets by 64 percent since June 2008
to the highest level on record . . . .”); see also POLLIN & HEINTZ, supra note 59, at 3 (“These
traders entered the market with enormous financial resources, enabling them to influence the
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that the price of oil increased 85% in 2009, despite the fact that the
available supply of crude oil in the United States was at a twenty-year
high while the demand for crude oil was at a ten-year low.61
Again, those institutions and wealthy investors speculating
through passive bets are not required to own any commodities,62 and
therefore by placing the bets do not otherwise put money into energy
or agricultural production.  As a report from the OPEC Petroleum
Studies Department stated:
[N]ew asset management strategies, financial product inno-
vation, and development of new institutional forms of invest-
ing (e.g. index and hedge funds) . . . paved the way for
greater financialization of the oil industry . . . . [This] has
resulted in greater . . . depth in the paper-oil market.  These
developments . . . have given rise to new investment assets
that get their reward from price performance of oil futures
and derivatives rather than the old-fashioned form of market
reward through capital investment into oil exploration and
extraction, and the resulting higher production.63
Wall Street banks that issue these investment vehicles hedge
against the passive investors’ bets by buying long in the corresponding
futures markets.64  Paper contracts are thereby created that call for the
making or taking of delivery of commodities that are far in excess of
the world inventory of those products.65  By betting on upward price
direction and hedging those bets in the physical commercial-oriented
futures market, Wall Street banks and large financial institutions send
continuous false “demand” signals to the markets, causing both com-
modity prices and spot prices to rise despite equilibrium between sup-
ply and demand.66
ups and downs of market prices to an unprecedented degree.  To a large extent, these traders are
affiliated with major investment banks, such as Goldman Sachs or UBS.”).
61 Regulatory Reform and the Derivatives Market: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Agric.,
Nutrition, & Forestry, 111th Cong. 39 (2009) (statement of Michael W. Masters, Managing Mem-
ber/Portfolio Manager, Masters Capital Mgmt., LLC).
62 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
63 AHMAD R. JALALI-NAINI, THE IMPACT OF FINANCIAL MARKETS ON THE PRICE OF OIL
AND VOLATILITY: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2007 9 (2009).
64 See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 76, 83–84.
65 See Financial Speculation in Commodity Markets: Are Institutional Investors and Hedge
Funds Contributing to Food and Energy Price Inflation?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Home-
land Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 41–42 (2008) (statement of Michael W. Masters,
Managing Member/Portfolio Manager, Masters Capital Mgmt., LLC).
66 See id. at 40–42.
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The ratio between commercial hedgers and speculators in a fu-
tures market is ideally 70:30.67  Prior to 2002, the average composition
of noncommercial speculators in the U.S. oil futures market was 20%,
but it rose to approximately 50% in 2009.68  Some estimates now place
the percentage of these speculators between 70%69 and 80%.70  The
resulting amount of excessive speculation is reflected by the fact that
approximately one billion barrels are traded in the synthetic oil fu-
tures markets per day, while only approximately eighty-five million
barrels of oil are actually produced per day.71  In other words, less
than 10% of what is traded in the oil futures markets consists of actual
oil.
C. Enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act
In response to the 2008 financial crisis, Congress enacted the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”)72 to improve and protect the nation’s financial sys-
tem.  Section 737 of the Act was written with the clear goal of re-
turning to the kind of hard position limits for noncommercial financial
institutions that prevailed before the CFTC granted stealth staff ex-
emptions from the position limits requirements of the CEA.73  Section
737 also strengthened position limits to cover not just classic futures
markets, but all derivatives markets, including swaps: “[T]he Commis-
sion shall by rule, regulation, or order establish limits on the amount
of positions, as appropriate, other than bona fide hedge positions, that
may be held by any person . . . .”74
67 See Masters 2009 Testimony, supra note 56, at 5 (“I believe that speculators should
ideally be in the range of 25%–35% of open interest.”); Dennis Kelleher, Speculators Are Driv-
ing up Gas Prices, CNNMONEY (Mar. 21, 2012, 5:55 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/21/mar-
kets/oil-gas-prices-speculators/index.htm.
68 MEDLOCK III & JAFFE, supra note 52, at 5.
69 Joseph P. Kennedy III, Op-Ed., The High Cost of Gambling on Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
11, 2012, at A23; GUILFORD, supra note 11; Hall & Rankin, supra note 51.  Between 1998 and
2008, “[t]he positions of bona fide physical hedgers doubled . . . while the positions of specula-
tors rose by 1200%.” MASTERS 2010 TESTIMONY, supra note 29, at 4.
70 Testimony of Michael Greenberger, Prof. of Law, Univ. of Md., Francis King Carey Sch.
of Law, Before the House Democratic Steering & Policy Committee 7 (Apr. 4, 2012), available at
http://michaelgreenberger.com/files/Greenberger_House_Dem_Policy_Testimony_040412_Final
_Draft.pdf.
71 KHAN, supra note 59, at 4; Kennedy, supra note 69.
72 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (“Dodd-Frank”) Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
73 See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
74 Dodd-Frank Act § 737, 124 Stat. at 1723 (emphasis added).
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During the hearings that led to the passage of Dodd-Frank, Sena-
tor Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) stated that “[p]osition limits provide an
important restriction on market manipulation and the amount of risk
that can build up in any one market participant,” and that the CFTC
would “be able to prevent speculators from assembling massive posi-
tions in a particular commodity, such as oil, by assembling large posi-
tions in multiple contracts.”75  Furthermore, Representative Collin
Peterson (D-Minn.), then Chairman of the House Committee on Ag-
riculture, stated: “We all remember when we had $147 oil . . . . This
conference report includes the tools we authorized and the direction
to the CFTC to mitigate outrageous price spikes we saw 2 years
ago.”76
D. Observations on the Effect of Excessive Speculation on Oil
Prices
While some have debated and denied it, the great weight of inde-
pendent authority finds that outsized excessive speculation in the
physical derivatives markets has caused unnecessary price volatility in
crude oil prices since 2008.  This volatility has led to unnecessary and
substantial increases in the prices that consumers pay for everyday
products such as gasoline and many other energy and food staples.
1. Market Participants
In March 2011, when the price of crude oil in the spot market was
more than $100 per barrel,77 the CEO of ExxonMobil testified to the
United States Senate Finance Committee that market fundamentals
only justified a price of $60 to $70 per barrel.78  Around the same time,
the General Counsel of Delta Air Lines stated that the marginal cost
of oil production on March 20, 2011, was $60 to $70 per barrel, which
deviated drastically from the WTI price at that time.79  By October
75 156 CONG. REC. S2699 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2010) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
76 156 CONG. REC. H5245 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Sen. Collin Peterson).
77 Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
78 Robert Lenzner, ExxonMobil CEO Says Oil Price Should Be $60 to $70 a Barrel,
FORBES (May 14, 2011, 10:29 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2011/05/14/exxon-
mobil-ceo-says-oil-price-should-be-60-70-a-barrel/.  Executives from Royal Dutch Shell, Mara-
thon Oil, and the Inland Oil Company also testified that speculation was to blame for rising oil
prices in 2008.  154 CONG. REC. S7101–02 (daily ed. July 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. Jim Webb).
79 Jim Spencer & Dee DePass, As We Pay More at the Pump, Oil Trading Curbs Still on
Hold, STAR TRIBUNE (Minn.), March 20, 2011, at 1D (quoting Ben Hirst, General Counsel,
Delta Air Lines: “[S]peculators try to anticipate what other speculators are going to do, and the
market overreacts.  It’s not as though there’s a shortage of product that caused the price to move
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2011, the $100-per-barrel bubble in the oil markets had burst, and the
price did in fact drop close to the $70 range.80
These revelations from airline and oil companies were not new.
In an “Open Letter to All Airline Customers” in 2008, the CEOs of
twelve U.S. airline companies wrote that “normal market forces are
being dangerously amplified by poorly regulated market specula-
tion.”81  The CEO of Virgin America, Inc. further characterized the
volatile fuel prices as “out of control” and “a kind of silent killer.”82
The largest airline trade association in the United States has joined
other industry associations in echoing these statements.83  The de-
creased ability of airlines to use futures markets for price risk manage-
ment has led some commentators to advise the airline industry to
abandon hedging entirely and handle volatile fuel prices with passen-
ger ticket surcharges instead.84
Gene Guilford, the Executive Director of the Independent Con-
necticut Petroleum Association, speaking on behalf of the New En-
gland Fuel Institute, stated that:
[W]e are no longer confident that the markets are doing
their job of providing our industry and consumers with a
benchmark for pricing product that is based on economic dy-
namics of supply and demand, and they no longer function as
a risk management tool.  They have become completely dis-
connected from reality.85
up.  It’s a casino process with financial players betting on where the price is going to go.  But it
has an effect on [current] prices.”).
80 Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
81 An Open Letter to All Airline Customers, CNBC (July 9, 2008, 8:47 PM), http://www.
cnbc.com/id//_Open_Letter_to_All_Airline_Customers; David Goldman, Airlines: Curb Oil
Speculation, CNNMONEY (July 9, 2008, 6:18 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/09/news/compa-
nies/airlines_speculation_letter.
82 Mary Jane Credeur, Mary Schlangenstein & Paul Burkhardt, United, Delta Profit at Risk
on ‘Silent Killer’ Hedges, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2011, 4:39 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-01-31/united-delta-profit-at-risk-from-silent-killer-in-fuel-hedges.html.
83 Joint Letter from Airlines for America et al. to Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n (Mar. 19, 2012), available at http://images.politico.com/global/2012/03/
120320_eemac.html; see also AIRLINES FOR AMERICA, http://www.airlines.org/Pages/Home.aspx
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013).  Many other market participants have echoed these statements. En-
ergy Speculation: Is Greater Regulation Necessary to Stop Price Manipulation? (Part II): Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
110th Cong. 100 (2008) (statement of Roger Diwan, Partner & Head of Fin. Advisory, PFC
Energy) (stating that if regulatory changes are adopted, “it’s clear that prices will reflect closer
to marginal cost of producing oil”); id. (statement of Edward Krapels, Dir., Energy Sec. Analy-
sis, Inc.) (“I think the amount of speculation is really substantial [within the crude oil market].”).
84 Credeur, Schlangenstein & Burkhardt, supra note 82.
85 Guilford Statement, supra note 12, at 168.
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After the price of crude oil reached $139 in June 2008, Guilford
noted that the amount of crude oil traded in the markets that day was
fifty-three times the daily U.S. consumption.86  And, during the wild
swings in crude oil prices since that time, continuous ample supply has
existed to meet the demand for oil.87
Guilford has also pointed to the situation of heating oil during the
unseasonably warm winter of 2011–2012 to show plainly the effects of
excessive speculation in a commodities market.  Although the volume
of heating oil sold by retailers was approximately one-third less than
normal during this time, the commodity cost was approximately $3 per
gallon,88 which was relatively close to the record high of $3.71 per gal-
lon.89  Furthermore, the price for a barrel of heating oil was $135 while
a barrel of crude oil was $104.90  Guilford noted that there was so little
demand during those seventy-degree winter days that retailers could
not “give away heating oil.”91  Thus, the market was simply over-
whelmed by speculators betting the price up through, for example,
commodity index swaps, which required swaps dealers to lay off their
risk by buying huge amounts of long heating oil futures unencum-
bered by any meaningful position limits.92
2. Bankers and Investors
In February 2012, when the price of crude reached $109 per gal-
lon,93 Goldman Sachs stated in an internal report that each barrel of
oil costs approximately$23 more than it would without the excessive
speculation present in the markets today.94  Similarly, the Chief
Global Investment Officer of J.P. Morgan stated that during the sum-
86 Id.  Furthermore, the amount of heating oil traded during that summer day equaled half
of U.S. consumption for an entire year. Id.
87 See id. at 168–69.
88 See C-SPAN Video, supra note 9.
89 See James Walsh, Home-Heating Oil Prices Near Decade High, TIMES HERALD-RECORD
(Middletown, N.Y.) (Dec. 11, 2011, 2:00 AM), http://www.recordonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/arti-
cle?AID=/20111211/NEWS/112110323.
90 C-SPAN Video, supra note 9.
91 Id.
92 See supra notes 52–66 and accompanying text.
93 Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
94 See Robert Lenzner, Speculation in Crude Oil Adds $23.39 to the Price Per Barrel,
FORBES (Feb. 27, 2012, 3:07 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2012/02/27/specula-
tion-in-crude-oil-adds-23-39-to-the-price-per-barrel/; see also Alain Sherter, When Goldman
Sachs Warns that Speculation Drives Oil Prices, Listen Up, CBSNEWS (Apr. 13, 2011, 2:45 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-43552722/when-goldman-sachs-warns-that-specula-
tion-drives-oil-prices-listen-up/.
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mer of 2008 “an enormous amount of speculation ran up the price”
and that “140 dollars in July [2008] was ridiculous.”95
Hedge fund investor George Soros has also maintained that vola-
tility in the price of oil (and other commodities) is a result of excessive
speculation, stating in 2008 that the oil futures market was experienc-
ing a bubble fed by too much speculation.96  He entered a massive
short position in crude oil at $137 per barrel during the summer of
2008 when oil prices reached record highs and profited when they fell
precipitously to $30 in December 2008.97
Michael Masters, a hedge fund manager, has repeatedly testified
that passive investments from institutional investors have upset the
price discovery mechanisms of crude oil and other commodities fu-
tures markets:
[P]assive speculators drain liquidity by buying and holding
large quantities of futures contracts—basically acting as con-
sumers who never actually take delivery of goods.  Passive
speculators “invest” in a commodity or basket of commodi-
ties (such as an index), and continuously roll their position,
as part of a long-term portfolio diversification strategy.  This
strategy is completely blind to the supply and demand reali-
ties in the market.  As such, passive speculators not only un-
dermine, but actually destroy the price discovery function of
the market and make way for the formation of speculative
bubbles.98
3. Financial Analysts
Financial analysts have also spoken out about increased specula-
tion in the oil futures markets.  Tim Evans, an energy analyst at Citi
Futures Perspective, has stated: “With the latest push to the upside,
we see the crude oil market becoming even more completely divorced
from any connection to fundamental factors and becoming even more
95 60 Minutes, Did Speculation Fuel Oil Price Swings?, CBSNEWS (Apr. 14, 2009, 12:03
PM), http://.cbsnews.com/-18560_162-4707770.html [hereinafter 60 Minutes Report] (internal
quotation marks omitted).
96 Edmund Conway, George Soros: Rocketing Oil Price Is a Bubble, TELEGRAPH (May 26,
2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/2790539/
George-Soros-rocketing-oil-price-is-a-bubble.html (quoting Soros: “The price has this parabolic
shape which is characteristic of bubbles . . . .”); see also Soros Testimony, supra note 58, at
233–36.
97 Lenzner, supra note 94; see also Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
98 Masters 2010 Testimony, supra note 29, at 5; see also Masters 2009 Testimony, supra
note 56, at 17.
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obsessed with the simple question, ‘How high can it go?’”99  Further-
more, Evans has also explained that the feelings and whims of inves-
tors move the price of oil more than supply and demand
fundamentals.100  Echoing these statements, another Citigroup oil ana-
lyst stated that the oil price outlook is “more subjective than ever and
hence leaves any long-term oil price assertion equally subjective and
somewhat irrespective of traditional ‘fundamental’ analysis.”101  Simi-
larly, a study published by Deutsche Bank Research concludes that
speculators’ dispersion of beliefs—i.e., the willingness of speculators
to engage in trading activity even when a large gap exists between
market prices and fundamentally justified prices—has a significant im-
pact on oil prices.102
Other financial analysts have spoken more forcefully about the
need to address speculation in the oil markets, including the former
chair of the Petroleum Marketers Association of America, who has
called excessive speculation the fuel that has driven the “runaway
train” in crude oil prices.103  Likewise, economist Mike Norman has
repeatedly argued that speculation plays a key role in volatile oil
prices: “Oil prices are high because of speculation, pure and simple.
That’s not an assertion, that’s a fact.  Yet rather than attack the specu-
lation and rid ourselves of the problem, we flail away at the
symptoms.”104
99 Tim Evans, PM Energy News & Views, CITI FUTURES PERSP., July 3, 2008, at 2.
100 See David Sheppard, Oil Boasts Fourth-Biggest Daily Price Gain Ever, GLOBE & MAIL
(June 29, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://m.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/en-
ergy-and-resources/oil-boasts-fourth-biggest-daily-price-gain-ever/article4381474/?service=mo-
bile (quoting Evans: “What has changed today is the market sentiment, the fundamentals may
evolve at a more glacial pace.”).
101 Mufson, supra note 58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
102 Jochen Mo¨bert, Do Speculators Drive Oil Prices? Dispersion in Beliefs Among Specula-
tors as a Determinant of Crude Oil Prices 3 (Deutsche Bank Research, Working Paper Series,
Research Notes 32, 2009), available at http://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?Col
umnView=0&Function=showPeriOverview(NERESNOT;noTopic;noRegion)&Submit=Show
Pdf&rwnode=DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD$RSNN0000000000136534&rwobj=ReFIND.Re
FindSearch.class&rwsite=DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD&type=callFunction. The fact that the
dispersion of beliefs, not speculators themselves, leads to excessively high oil prices demon-
strates the need for some speculation to maintain liquidity in the futures markets. See supra
notes 31–32 and accompanying text; see also JALALI-NAINI, supra note 63, at 67 (commenting on
the effects of “exaggerated high price expectations”).
103 Jonathan Davis, Speculators ‘Not to Blame’ for Oil Prices, UPSTREAM (Apr. 4, 2008),
http://.upstreamonline.com/live/article151805.ece (quoting Sean Cota, head of a heating fuel
dealers trade group) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Molly Moorhead, Who to
Blame for the Price at the Pump? Tough to Say, POLITIFACT (Apr. 30, 2012, 4:09 PM), http://
www.politifact.com/florida/article/2012/apr/30/who-blame-price-pump-tough-say/.
104 Mike Norman, The Danger of Speculation, FOX NEWS (Aug. 19, 2005), http://www.
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In the same way, Fadel Gheit, a managing director and senior
analyst covering the oil and gas sector for Oppenheimer & Co., im-
plores regulators to address the root of this issue:
It is not Exxon . . . or BP . . . or Shell . . . that moves the oil
markets.  It is the financial players.  It is the Goldman
Sachs . . ., the Morgan Stanley . . ., or the other guys.  It is a
shame on the government that allows them to get away with
that.105
4. International and Domestic Leaders
The minister of petroleum and mineral resources in Saudi Arabia,
Ali Naimi, has decried volatile oil prices on numerous occasions, in-
cluding in March 2012 when the price for a barrel of oil reached
$128.106  Naimi declared: “I think high prices are unjustified today [on]
a supply-demand basis,” noting that global supply was exceeding de-
mand by one million to two million barrels per day.107  Regardless,
Naimi offered to increase his nation’s output of oil “by as much as 25
per cent [sic] if necessary,”108 and he has forcefully argued that there
has never been a shortage of oil to justify higher prices:
We want to correct the myth that there is, or could be, a
shortage.  It is an irrational fear, a fear without basis.  Saudi
Arabia’s current capacity is 12.5 [million] barrels per day,
way beyond current levels demanded, and a reliable buffer
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,166038,00.html; see also Brenda Buttner, Main Street Feeling Price
Pinch, FOX NEWS (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/on-air/cost-of-freedom/2012/02/27/
main-street-feeling-price-pinch (quoting Mike Norman: “That is outside any of the normal rules
of economics.  In my opinion, there’s only one reason for it and that is speculation rearing its
ugly head just as it did in 2008.  I don’t even know why we have to have this discussion as to
whether or not it’s contributing.  It’s absolutely contributing because every economic factor tells
you that gas should be coming down, not up.”).
105 Alejandro Lazo, Energy Stocks Haven’t Caught Up with Oil Prices, WASH. POST, Mar.
23, 2008, at F1 (quoting Gheit: “The largest speculators are the largest financial companies.”);
Ed Wallace, Has the U.S. Turned Against Consumers?, BUSINESSWEEK (July 6, 2011), http://www.
businessweek.com/top-news/has-the-us-turned-against-consumers-07062011.html (internal quo-
tation marks omitted); see also Kevin G. Hall, Speculators Blamed for Rising Oil, Gas Prices,
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 23, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://.nwsource.com//2017563277.html (quoting
Gheit: “Speculation is now part of the DNA of oil prices.  You cannot separate the two anymore.
There is no demarcation.”); Executive Profile: Fadel Gheit, BUSINESSWEEK, http://investing.busi-
nessweek.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=29160194&ticker=OPY (last visited
Jan. 18, 2013).
106 Chazan, Prices Unjustified, supra note 10; see also Ali Naimi, Saudi Arabia Will Act to
Lower Soaring Oil Prices, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
9e1ccb48-781c-11e1-b237-00144feab49a.html#axzz2IMGyyqNc.
107 Chazan, Prices Unjustified, supra note 10.
108 Id. In fact, Saudi Arabia was already producing oil at thirty-year highs. Id.
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against any temporary loss of production.  Saudi Arabia has
invested a great deal to sustain its capacity, and it will use
spare production capacity to supply the oil market with any
additional required volumes.109
With full worldwide reserves of oil and increased oil production
among OPEC members and many other nations, “[t]here is no ra-
tional reason why oil prices are continuing to remain at these high
levels.”110
The Secretary General of OPEC, Abdalla Salem El-Badri, has
gone a step further and blamed excessive speculation for the unjusti-
fied prices in crude oil.  Stating that “[a]nything that will reduce this
speculation activity . . . is a step in the right direction,”111 he has urged
and praised the CFTC’s efforts to implement position limits.112  This
was not the first time OPEC has taken this stance.  As early as 2005,
the former acting Secretary General, Adnan Shihab-Eldin, said:
Today, and especially with non-fundamental factors—such as
speculation in oil futures markets—playing such a critical
role in oil price determination, we feel that leaving such a
sensitive trading environment as the oil market to its own
devices would surely be a recipe for disaster, both for pro-
ducers and consumers.113
President Obama has on at least four occasions attributed the re-
peated and extreme spikes in crude oil and gasoline prices to specula-
tive activity by large financial players in the oil market: (1) during the
summer of his 2008 presidential campaign, when crude oil was ap-
109 Naimi, supra note 106.
110 Id.  Saudi Arabia has increased oil production during many critical emergencies around
the world in the past. Id.  The persistent fear and uncertainty about oil supply, however, has
remained prime fodder for promoting excessive speculation.  Didier Sornette, Ryan Woodard &
Wei-Xing Zhou, The 2006–2008 Oil Bubble: Evidence of Speculation, and Prediction, 388
PHYSICA A 1571, 1574 (2009).
111 OPEC Against ‘Excessive’ Oil Speculation, OIL & GAS NEWS (Feb. 8, 2010), .oilandgas-
newsonline.com//.aspx?aid=28267 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112 Maher Chmaytelli, OPEC Calls for Curbing Oil Speculation, Blames Funds, BLOOM-
BERG (Jan. 28, 2009, 12:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aVRKbFhcfdKM.
113 Adnan Shihab-Eldin, Speech to the Cosmopolitan Club Vienna: Oil and Development:
The Role of OPEC: A Historical Perspective and Outlook to the Future (Mar. 24, 2005), availa-
ble at http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/press_room/894.htm; see also Kenneth N. Gilpin, OPEC
Agrees to Increase Output in July to Ease Oil Prices, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2004), http://www.ny
times.com/2004/06/03/business/03CND-OIL.html?pagewanted=all (“There is not a crude
shortage, which is why OPEC was so reluctant to raise production.  But prices got so high that
they had to increase production to quell the speculation and fear that is in the market.”).
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proaching its world record high of $147 per barrel;114 (2) April 19,
2011, when crude oil reached $110 per barrel;115 (3) March 2012, when
oil prices spiked to $106 per barrel;116 and (4) April 17, 2012, when
gasoline prices approached $4 per gallon.117  As he had in April 2011,
in March 2012 the President once again convened an interagency task
force led by the Department of Justice to investigate illegal manipula-
tion of crude oil prices.118  Meanwhile, congressional investigations
(often bipartisan) have uncovered excessive speculation in the oil
markets.119
Other international leaders have expressed similar statements.
Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and former French
President Nicolas Sarkozy jointly called for renewed investigations
into the effect of trading activity on amplified erratic price movements
in crude oil.120  Likewise, former Chinese President Jiang Ze-min
noted that “the rapid growth of global capital market, virtual econ-
114 Caren Bohan, Obama Vows to Crack Down on Oil Speculation, REUTERS (June 22,
2008, 5:37 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/06/22/us-usa-politics-obama-energy-idUSN2
243134220080622; Kebede, supra note 4.
115 Jeff Mason, Obama Blames Speculators for Rising U.S. Fuel Prices, REUTERS (Apr. 20,
2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/20/us-usa-energy-obama-speculators-id
USTRE73J1NN20110420; Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
116 Kevin G. Hall & Lesley Clark, Back to Work for Gas Price Unit, ST. LOUIS POST-DIS-
PATCH (March 9, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/national/back-to-work-for-gas-
price-unit/article_212a4a50-32f3-5375-973e-74a3beb26924.html; Petroleum & Other Liquids,
EIA, supra note 4.
117 Helene Cooper, As Gas Prices Cast Cloud, Obama Calls for Scrutiny on Market, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2012, at A19.
118 See Hall & Clark, supra note 116.
119 See, e.g., STAFF OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON HOME-
LAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 110TH CONG., EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATU-
RAL GAS MARKET 6 (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter NATURAL GAS REPORT] (concluding that
one company’s “actions in causing significant price movements in the natural gas market demon-
strate that excessive speculation distorts prices, increases volatility, and increases costs and risks
for natural gas consumers . . . who ultimately pass on inflated costs to their customers”); STAFF
OF PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMEN-
TAL AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., THE ROLE OF MARKET SPECULATION IN RISING OIL AND GAS
PRICES: A NEED TO PUT THE COP BACK ON THE BEAT 2 (Comm. Print 2006) (concluding that
“[t]he large purchases of crude oil futures contracts by speculators have, in effect, created an
additional demand for oil, driving up the price of oil to be delivered in the future in the same
manner that additional demand for the immediate delivery of a physical barrel of oil drives up
the price on the spot market”);. Cf. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 13, at 3 (concluding that there
is “significant and persuasive evidence that one of the major reasons for the recent market
problems is the unusually high level of speculation in the Chicago wheat futures market due to
purchases of futures contracts by index traders offsetting sales of commodity index
instruments”).
120 Brown & Sarkozy, supra note 11.
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omy, financial derivatives and the overflow of speculation funds have
great impacts on the oil market.”121
5. Academics and Economists
Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman,122 who originally
remained steadfast in his belief that market fundamentals dictated
crude oil prices, ultimately embraced the argument that excessive
speculative activity is driving up the price of oil.  As Krugman ob-
served: “Last year I was skeptical about claims that speculation was
central to the price rise . . . . [T]his time there’s no question: specula-
tion has been driving prices up.”123
Many quantitative studies have demonstrated statistically signifi-
cant effects of excessive speculation activity on oil prices.  Researchers
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis demonstrate in a working
paper the effects of speculation shocks, along with oil supply, global
demand, and oil inventory demand, on the price of oil.124  The re-
searchers define speculation shock as arising from a shift in the ex-
pected future spot price that can be disconnected from market
fundamentals due to an increase in oil prices driven by trading activity
in the oil futures market.125  Using a statistical model, they conclude
that speculation shocks are the second most important driver of move-
ment in the price of oil behind global demand.126
Researchers from the European Central Bank have also found
that “destabilizing financial activity,” which primarily involves passive
investment in oil futures through such vehicles as commodity index
funds, significantly impacts oil price swings in the short run.127  They
further conclude through their statistical model that this inefficient fi-
121 Jiang Ze-min, Reflections on Energy Issues in China, 13 J. SHANGHAI JIAOTONG U. 257,
261 (2008); Edward Wong, Long Retired, Ex-Leader of China Asserts Sway over Top Posts, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 8, 2012, at A1.
122 Press Release, The Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., The Prize in Economics 2008 (Oct. 13,
2008), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2008/press.html.
123 Paul Krugman, Oil Speculation, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2009, 9:01 AM),http://krugman.
blogs.nytimes.com//07//oil-speculation/?scp=2&sq=speculative%20trading%20in%20oil&st=cse.
124 Luciana Juvenal & Ivan Petrella, Speculation in the Oil Market 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2011-027E, 2011) (revised June 2012), available at http://re-
search.stlouisfed.org/wp/2011/2011-027.pdf.
125 Id. at 3–4.
126 See id.  The researchers found that their speculation shocks variable “pick[ed] up the
effects of financialization driven by the rapid growth of commodity index investment.” Id. at 4;
see also supra notes 52–61 and accompanying text (discussing commodity index funds).
127 Marco J. Lombardi & Ine Van Robays, Do Financial Investors Destabilize the Oil Price?
7–8, 11 (European Cent. Bank Working Paper Series, Paper No. 1346, 2011), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1847503.
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nancial activity in the oil futures market caused oil prices to be fifteen
percent greater than the level justified by oil fundamentals between
2000 and 2008.128  Likewise, country desk economists and mission
chiefs from the International Monetary Fund have concluded: “In
summary, it appears that speculation has played a significant role in
the run-up in oil prices as the U.S. dollar has weakened and investors
have looked for a hedge in oil futures . . . .”129
Kenneth J. Singleton of Stanford University found that growing
positions of commodity index investors had significant effects on oil
futures market returns during the 2008 boom and bust in oil prices.130
He also criticized studies concluding otherwise because those studies
measured the effects of investor flows in futures markets over short
horizons (such as a few days) rather than weeks or months, as did his
investigations.131  Similarly, another study shows that the hedging
trades of the issuers of commodity linked notes in the futures markets
significantly raise the underlying futures prices.132
The researchers mentioned above are joined by many other aca-
demics and economists who have found that excessive speculation in
commodity markets has a significant impact on oil prices.133
128 Id. at 25.
129 INT’L MONETARY FUND, REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 59, at 28.
130 See Kenneth J. Singleton, Investor Flows and the 2008 Boom/Bust in Oil Prices 17–24,
27 (Mar. 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1793449.
131 See id. at 15.
132 Brian J. Henderson, Neil D. Pearson & Li Wang, New Evidence on the Financialization
of Commodity Markets 2 (Nov. 6, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990828 (“For issues with proceeds greater than or
equal to $2 million, $5 million, and $10 million, the investor demands for commodity exposure
raise the underlying commodity futures prices by an average of 37, 40, and 51 basis points, re-
spectively around the pricing dates of the [commodity linked notes].”).
133 See DAVID P. ANDERSON ET AL., AGRIC. & FOOD POLICY CTR., THE EFFECTS OF ETHA-
NOL ON TEXAS FOOD AND FEED 3 (2008), available at http://www.afpc.tamu.edu/pubs/2/515/RR-
08-01.pdf (“Speculative fund activities in futures markets have led to more money in the markets
and more volatility.  Increased price volatility has encouraged wider trading limits.  The end
result has been the loss of the ability to use futures markets for price risk management due to the
inability to finance margin requirements.”); MEDLOCK III & JAFFE, supra note 52, at 3;;
MACHIKO NISSANKE, COMMON FUND FOR COMMODITIES, COMMODITY MARKETS AND EXCESS
VOLATILITY: SOURCES AND STRATEGIES TO REDUCE ADVERSE DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS 25–26,
54 (2011); L. RANDALL WRAY, LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD COLL., THE COMMODITIES MARKET
BUBBLE: MONEY MANAGER CAPITALISM AND THE FINANCIALIZATION OF COMMODITIES 9
(2008), available at http://www.levyinstitute.org//_96.pdf; Cifarelli & Paladino, supra note 59, at
371 (“[L]arge daily upward and downward shifts in oil prices do not fit a fundamental-driven
market.”); Robert Czudaj & Joscha Beckmann, Spot and Futures Commodity Markets and the
Unbiasedness Hypothesis—Evidence from a Novel Panel Unit Root Test, 32 ECON. BULL. 1695,
1701 (2012); James D. Hamilton, Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08, 2009
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 215, 240 (2009) (“With hindsight, it is hard to deny that
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E. Rebuttal to Fundamentalist Arguments
Despite the weight of the evidence demonstrating that excessive
speculation in commodity futures markets leads to deleterious volatil-
ity in the movement of oil prices, some continue to argue that the
market fundamentals of supply and demand are the sole contributing
factor to that volatility.134  The basic argument made by these market
fundamentalists is that oil price spikes have occurred because the in-
creasing worldwide demand for oil—especially from China and other
developing nations—surpasses the worldwide supply.135  This imbal-
ance in supply and demand is the classical cause of rising prices that
lead to equilibrium in the market.136
Although the absolute demand for oil has grown, what these
studies and analyses blaming market fundamentals for price volatility
the price of oil rose too high in July 2008 and that this miscalculation was influenced in part by
the flow of investment dollars into commodity futures contracts.”); Robert F. Kaufmann, The
Role of Market Fundamentals and Speculation in Recent Price Changes for Crude Oil, 39 EN-
ERGY POL’Y 105, 114 (2011); Tang & Xiong, supra note 56, at 72; Nouriel Roubini, Opinion, The
Risk of a Double-Dip Recession is Rising, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2009, 6:55 PM), http://.ft.com//s/0/
90227fdc-900d-11de-bc59-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1hwna8cxk; R.S. Eckaus, The Oil Price Really
Is A Speculative Bubble 1 (Ctr. for Energy & Envtl. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 08-007,
2008) available at http://web.mit.edu/ceepr/www/publications//-007.pdf; Michael Greenberger,
The Relationship of Unregulated Excessive Speculation to Oil Market Price Volatility 1 (Jan. 15,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.michaelgreenberger.com/files/IEF-
Greenberger-AppendixVII.pdf; Yannick Le Pen & Benoıˆt Se´vi, Futures Trading and the Excess
Comovement of Commodity Prices 2–4 (Jan. 24, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191659; Akira Yanagisawa, Decomposition
Analysis of the Soaring Crude Oil Prices 13 (March 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://eneken.ieej.or.jp///pdf/421.pdf (noting that “current oil prices are quite different from the
fundamental prices”); see also Modernizing America’s Financial Regulatory Structure: Hearing
Before the Cong. Oversight Panel, 111th Cong. 90 (2009) (statement of Joseph E. Stiglitz, Profes-
sor, Columbia Bus. Sch.) (arguing that only standardized and regulated products used for hedg-
ing against risk, but not gambling, should be permitted); Statement of James K. Galbraith, Chair
Gov’t/Bus. Relations, Lyndon B. Johnson Sch. Pub. Affairs, Univ. of Tex., to the Commission on
Deficit Reduction (June 30, 2010), available at http://.newdeal20.org/////deficitcommissionrv.pdf.
134 Many “fundamentalists” rely on statistical models based on Granger causality tests,
which attempt to predict whether the past histories (or time series data) of variable X and varia-
ble Y assist in predicting variable Y. See In re Amaranth Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 269
F.R.D. 366, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining a Granger causality test); see also, e.g., Scott H.
Irwin, Dwight R. Sanders & Robert P. Merrin, Devil or Angel? The Role of Speculation in the
Recent Commodity Price Boom (and Bust), 41 J. AGRIC. & APPLIED ECON. 377, 377–78, 385–87
(2009).  However, research has shown that Granger tests cannot handle data characterized by
high volatility such as oil prices. FRENK, supra note 6, at 2–3, 6–7; Sir Richard Branson, Michael
Masters & David Frenk, Letter to the Editor, Swaps, Spots and Bubbles, ECONOMIST, July 31,
2010, at 14.
135 See, e.g., Robert J. Samuelson, Op-Ed., The Fallacy of Blaming Oil ‘Speculators’, WASH.
POST, May 2, 2012, at A17.
136 Id.
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overlook is that the rate of growth in global demand for oil fell during
the period from 2004 to 2008 when prices spiked, despite China’s large
growth in demand, while production kept pace.137  Thus, given that the
worldwide supply of oil gained ground on meeting any increase in de-
mand, under supply and demand principles, the price of oil should
have dropped.  Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has consistently adjusted
its oil production, not only to cover drop-offs in oil production else-
where in the world, but also to meet unusually high increases in de-
mand.138  Saudi Arabia increased oil production following the invasion
of Iraq, a workers’ strike in Venezuela in 2002, Hurricane Katrina, and
the tumult from the Arab Spring in 2011.139  Saudi Arabia also
boosted oil production in 2004 to meet an unusually steep increase in
demand caused by China’s surging economy.140  In the future, Saudi
Arabia has promised to boost its production by as much as 25% if
needed to meet global demand due to the sanctions on Iranian crude
oil.141
Others have argued that uncertainty in world affairs creates fear
and expectation of reduced oil supplies in the future, which drives the
price of oil upward.142  Such uncertainty does indeed affect the oil
markets, but it does not explain the great volatility in oil prices of
recent years.  In order to explain the very large oil price spikes in 2004
and 2008 under this theory, a dramatic change in world conditions
must have occurred in those years, especially during the record peak
in 2008;143 however, no great jolt to international stability actually did
137 See FRENK, supra note 6, at 5; POLLIN & HEINTZ, supra note 59, at 3–4; Kaufmann,
supra note 133, at 105–06; Eckaus, supra note 133, at 6–8; see also The Fallacy of Blaming the
Market as the Sole Cause of High Gas Prices, RON WYDEN SENATOR FOR OREGON (May 9,
2012), http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/blog/post/the-fallacy-of-blaming-the-market-as-the-
sole-cause-of-high-gas-prices (responding to and countering Samuelson, supra note 135, by re-
vealing that in the beginning of 2012 supply exceeded demand and there was significant spare
capacity, yet the price of oil counterintuitively rose by more than twenty percent in the first
quarter).
138 See Naimi, supra note 106.
139 See id.
140 See id.
141 Chazan, Prices Unjustified, supra note 10.
142 See, e.g., Grant Smith, Brent Oil Rises a Second Day as Iran Risk Counters U.S. Supply
Increase, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 1, 2008, 8:02 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-01/
brent-oil-rises-a-second-day-as-iran-risk-counters-u-s-supply-increase.html (“From a fundamen-
tal point of view, prices should be much lower.  There’s at least $15 priced in from the Iran
factor.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143 See Eckaus, supra note 133, at 6 (“Short of a virtually complete shutdown of Middle
East oil production, no plausible price elasticity of demand would justify the quadrupling of oil
prices.”).
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occur during those periods.144  Indeed, evidence shows that uncer-
tainty, rather than driving up the price of oil, is the “fertilizer of specu-
lation,” causing oil prices to “increasingly decouple[ ] from
fundamental valuation (the hallmark of a bubble)” due to the actions
of speculators.145
More recently, some have argued that uncertainty in current
world affairs, particularly expectations of disruptions in oil due to the
events of the Arab Spring and Iran’s threat to close the Strait of Hor-
muz, have caused price spikes in oil.146  However, Saudi Arabia has
promised in both instances to make up any oil differential,147 and the
United States is now a net exporter of refined petroleum products.148
Thus, the claim that the price of oil is volatile due to uncertainty in
global conditions affecting supply and demand is without merit.
II. THE ENFORCEMENT OF STRONG POSITION LIMITS AND ANTI-
MANIPULATION RULES CONTEMPLATED BY DODD-FRANK
WILL DAMPEN EXCESSIVE SPECULATION
Recent history has shown that even just the threat of action by
the federal government has had a significant impact in curbing exces-
sive speculation.  With an array of regulations at its disposal as author-
ized by Dodd-Frank, the CFTC, along with other regulatory agencies,
will be able to decrease the excessive speculation that so significantly
affects the oil futures markets.
A. Enforcement (or Threatened Enforcement) Against Excessive
Speculation Has Forced down Prices
Congressional Democrats have repeatedly and successfully inter-
vened to blunt the adverse impact of excessive speculation on the
crude oil markets.  On June 26, 2008, as oil prices approached their
world record high, the House Democratic leadership and then-Chair-
man of the House Agriculture Committee, Collin Peterson, intro-
144 Id. at 5–6 (noting that there were no serious threats to stability during the relevant time
period).
145 Sornette, Woodard & Zhou, supra note 110, at 1576; see also YERGIN, supra note 58, at
170–71 (“With [economic growth and financialization] came more volatility, more fluctuations in
the price, which was drawing in the traders.”); F. William Engdahl, Perhaps 60% of Today’s Oil
Price Is Pure Speculation, GLOBAL RES. (May 2, 2008), http://www.globalresearch.ca/perhaps-60-
of-today-s-oil-price-is-pure-speculation/ (“Speculators trade on rumor, not fact.”).
146 See Jill Schlesinger, Gaza Crisis Boosts Oil Prices, CBSNEWS (Nov. 20, 2012, 1:49 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505123_162-57552466/gaza-crisis-boosts-oil-prices/; Smith, supra
note 142.
147 See Naimi, supra note 106.
148 See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
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duced legislation aimed at curbing excessive speculation,149 which
passed the House by a bipartisan vote of 402–19.150  The bill required
the CFTC to act pursuant to its authority under the CEA and declare
an “emergency” in the oil market, thereby triggering CFTC authority
to impose special limits on excessive speculative activity in crude oil
futures markets.151  Subsequently, on September 28, 2008, then-Chair-
man Peterson brought another bill to the House floor that would im-
pose tough speculative position limits.152  That bill also passed the
House, with a vote of 283–133.153
On July 15, 2008, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid introduced
legislation that would have imposed tough, congressionally driven lim-
its on excessive speculative activity in the crude oil futures markets.154
On July 25, 2008, that bill received fifty votes in favor with ninety-
three Senators present, representing a majority of the Senate but not
enough to invoke cloture.155  Despite the bill’s defeat, certain Republi-
can senators voted for cloture, and others indicated that they might
support the legislation in the future.156  Shortly thereafter, on July 31,
2008, Senators Wyden (D-Or.) and Grassley (R-Iowa) circulated a
widely publicized discussion draft bill that would have taxed profits
from passive speculative crude oil futures as ordinary income.157
149 Energy Markets Emergency Act of 2008, H.R. 6377, 110th Cong. (2008).
150 See David Cho, House Passes Bill Bolstering Oil Trade Regulator, WASH. POST (June 27,
2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/26/AR2008062604005.
html.
151 See H.R. 6377 § 2(b); see also House Passes Legislation Requiring CFTC to Curb Oil
Market Speculation, WIS. AGRIC. CONNECTION (June 27, 2008), http://www.wisconsinagconnec-
tion.com/story-national.php?Id=1516&yr=2008.
152 See Commodity Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2008, H.R. 6604,
110th Cong. § 8 (2008).
153 Press Release, H. Comm. on Agric., House of Representatives Approves Bill to
Strengthen Oversight of Futures Markets. (Sept. 18, 2008), available at http://agriculture.house.
gov/press-release/house-representatives-approves-bill-strengthen-oversight-futures-markets.
154 Stop Excessive Energy Speculation Act of 2008, S. 3268, 110th Cong. (2008); see ATA
Applauds Senator Reid and Other Sponsors of S. 3268, THOMASNET.COM (July 21, 2008), http://
news.thomasnet.com/companystory/ATA-applauds-Senator-Reid-and-other-sponsors-of-S-3268-
547049.
155 See On the Cloture Motion S. 3268, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
votes/110-2008/s184 (last visited Jan. 25, 2013).
156 See id. (noting that two Republicans voted in favor of the motion); Martin Kady II,
McConnell Hedges on Oil Speculation, POLITICO (July 21, 2008, 4:02 PM), http://www.politico.
com/blogs/thecrypt/0708/McConnell_hedges_on_oil_speculation_bill.html.
157 Press Release, Ron Wyden Senator for Or., Wyden-Grassley Staff Proposes Level Play-
ing Field for Oil Trade (July 31, 2008), available at http://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-re-
leases/wyden-grassley-staff-proposes-level-playing-field-for-oil-trade; see, e.g., Ryan J.
Donmoyer, Grassley, Wyden Eye Tax on Hedge Fund Oil Speculators, BLOOMBERG (July 31,
2008, 5:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aDdrpcl91lco.
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The combination of all of these congressional efforts led specula-
tors to fear that Congress would take immediate action to limit specu-
lation in commodities markets, so they abandoned these markets in
droves.158  The mass exodus of passive bettors from the crude oil mar-
ket precipitated a radical drop in the price of a barrel of crude oil—
the price dropped from its July 2008 world record high of $147 per
barrel to $30 per barrel by December of that year.159
In the winter of 2009, when financial institutions realized that
Congress would not pass legislation stopping excessive speculation,
the price of oil once again spiked.160  Gas prices rose fifty-four days in
a row in the spring of 2009, and by July 2009, the price of a barrel of
crude oil reached $69.161  During this period of high oil and gas prices,
the legislation that later became the Dodd-Frank Act began making
its way through Congress.162  President Obama and Democratic lead-
ers made clear that the legislation aimed to impose tough new limits
on excessive speculation in commodity derivatives markets and to
strengthen the hand of the CFTC by allowing the agency to pursue
market manipulation cases more easily.163  The message was appar-
ently received.  By the time Dodd-Frank was signed into law, crude oil
prices had stabilized for almost eighteen months, with prices fluctuat-
ing between $75 and $85 per barrel.164  However, as shown below, the
CFTC in January 2011 barely mustered enough votes to report out a
very weak proposed position limit rule.165  In response to these signs
that Dodd-Frank would not be properly implemented, the price of
crude oil immediately soared to $95 per barrel by February 2011.166
Similarly, when the CFTC promulgated the still-weak final position
limit rule in October 2011, the price of crude oil shot back up in No-
vember from $75 to more than $100.167
158 See 60 Minutes Report, supra note 95.
159 See id.; supra note 4 and accompanying text.
160 Cf. Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. Considers Curbs on Speculative Trading of Oil, N.Y.
TIMES, July 8, 2009, at A1 (noting that oil prices “bounced back to more than $60” after the
dramatic fall to “$33 a barrel” in December).
161 Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
162 See BAIRD WEBEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40975 FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM AND THE 111TH CONGRESS 1 (2010).
163 See Ben Lilliston, Wall Street Reform Bill Signed Today Will Limit Excessive Specula-
tion in Agriculture, IATP (July 20, 2010), http://www.iatp.org/documents/wall-street-reform-bill-
signed-today-will-limit-excessive-speculation-in-agriculture.
164 See Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
165 See infra notes 174–89 and accompanying text.
166 See Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
167 See id.
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On April 19, 2011, President Obama stated that the oil price
spikes in February and April 2011 did not result from market funda-
mentals, but from crude oil market manipulation by noncommercial
speculators.168  He subsequently convened an interagency task force
led by the Department of Justice to investigate manipulation in the
crude oil market.169  Presumably as a result of the threatened prosecu-
tions for market manipulation, the price of crude oil was, by October
2011, back down to around $75.170  According to statements made by
the CEO of ExxonMobil in April 2011, this price accurately reflected
market fundamentals.171  Yet when the CFTC issued its final weak po-
sition limit rule in October 2011,172 the price of crude oil again in-
creased significantly from $75 to more than $100 in November,
leading the President to reconvene the interagency task force in
March 2012.173
B. Legal Weapons Against Excessive Speculation
1. Position Limits
As required by Dodd-Frank,174 the CFTC approved by a 3–2 vote
its final rule for position limits on futures and swaps on October 18,
2011.175  The rule establishes speculative position limits for twenty-
eight commodity futures contracts, including NYMEX WTI Light
Sweet Crude Oil.176  It establishes that no trader may hold or own a
position in “Referenced Contracts” in the same commodity if the po-
sition exceeds a spot-month position limit of 25% of the “estimated
spot-month deliverable supply.”177  Furthermore, the non-spot-month
168 See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
170 See Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
171 See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
172 See Deconstructing Dodd-Frank, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2012/12/11/business/Deconstructing-Dodd-Frank.html.
173 See Cooper, supra note 117; Hall & Clark, supra note 116; Kevin G. Hall, Whatever
Happened to Task Force on Oil Speculation?, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (Mar. 1, 2012 7:43
AM), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/03/01/140564/whatever-happened-to-task-force.html;
Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
174 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 737, 124 Stat. 1376, 1722–23 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a)(2)).
175 Position Limits for Futures and Swaps, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,626, 71,626, 71,699 (Nov. 18,
2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 1, 150, 151).
176 See id. at 71,635, 71,686 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 151.2).  The position limits rule also
applies to futures and swaps that are economically equivalent to those contracts. Id. at 71,626.
177 Position Limits for Futures and Swaps, 17 C.F.R. § 151.4(a) (2012).  This rule becomes
effective for oil futures contracts on “January 1st of the second calendar year after the term
‘swap’ is further defined.” See id. § 151.4(d)(2).
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position limits rule establishes that no trader may hold or control posi-
tions that exceed 10% of the first 25,000 contracts and 2.5% thereafter
in all months combined (including the spot-month) or in a single
month.178
Unfortunately, market observers, academics, and commercial
users of commodity staples futures and swaps markets have raised
substantial questions as to whether these position limits are strong
enough to satisfy the Dodd-Frank mandate.179  In particular, many be-
lieve that the 25% spot-month deliverable supply limit per speculator
is far too high.180  Recognizing this, Senator Maria Cantwell has lik-
ened the “broad rule” to “setting the speed limit at 125 miles per
hour” and further expressed her disappointment that the rule “is sim-
ply too weak to meaningfully protect consumers.”181
The general counsel of Delta Air Lines also believes that this
limit on speculative positions is far too high.  He maintains that “[the
CFTC is] not proposing to adopt rules that will have any effect on
speculation . . . . They are only making sure no one can corner the
market.”182  In other words, the position limits levels may be effective
to prevent extreme forms of market manipulation, but they are insuf-
ficient to fulfill the separate statutory objectives of: (1) stopping exces-
sive speculation, which requires no showing of intent to manipulate
the market, but in the aggregate constrains market fundamentals;183
and (2) reducing speculative participation in these markets down from
178 Id. § 151.4(b)(1).  This rule becomes effective for oil futures contracts after twelve
months of collection of swap positional data. Id. § 151.4(d)(3).
179 See, e.g., Sanati, supra note 56.
180 See id. (“Wall Street could swallow a 25% limit on the prompt month given the im-
mense volume on that contract . . . .”).
181 Press Release, Maria Cantwell, U.S. Senator for Wash., Cantwell: Weak Wall Street
Speculation Rule is ‘Like Setting Speed Limit at 125 MPH’ (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://
www.cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=334518.  Likewise, Senator Bernie Sanders has
stated that the 25% spot-month deliverable supply rule is “not enough.” See Ben Geman, Regu-
lators Impose Limits on Oil Speculation, THE HILL (Oct. 18, 2011, 2:45 PM), http://.com//-wire/
e2-wire/188239-market-regulators-impose-oil-speculation-curbs.
182 Spencer & DePass, supra note 79, at 10 (quoting Ben Hirst) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
183 See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text; see also Dan M. Berkovitz, Position Lim-
its and the Hedge Exemption, Brief Legislative History, COMMODITIES FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N (July 28, 2009), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/berkovitzstate-
ment072809 (describing administrative reports that conclude that “large speculative positions,
even without manipulative intent, can cause ‘disturbances’ and ‘wild and erratic’ price
fluctuations”).
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its current level of 70% to 80% to around 20%, which was the norm
prior to the CFTC staff stealth exemptions discussed above.184
For example, in order to corner the market, one might need to
control the majority of the available supply for that commodity.  How-
ever, one would not need to control the majority of available supply to
engage in excessive speculation.  Aggregate betting on the price direc-
tion of commodities by speculators (who compose a majority of a mar-
ket) can destabilize market fundamentals, even when they do not
intend to do so.185
The CEA defines “excessive speculation” as any commodity
under contracts of sale “causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations
or unwarranted changes in the price of such commodity.”186  There-
fore, prohibited speculative betting is that which exceeds the need to
create liquidity for commercial handlers and thus causes price changes
that defy market fundamentals of supply and demand.187  Because the
relevant crude oil futures market now has 80% speculative participa-
tion (with no one speculator likely to control more than 25% of the
market), the new position limits, rather than restoring the market to
70:30 in favor of commercial entities, will likely just preserve the mar-
ket as one for speculators instead of commercial users.
It is important to note that manipulation of markets that results
from intentional wrongdoing is completely different from excessive
speculation, which can occur through the destructive flooding of the
market with thousands of passive price directional bettors who lack
any intent to cause harm.188  To prevent this unintentional harm, some
have called for the CFTC to set the position levels at 5% of open
interest up to the first 25,000 contracts, and 2.5% thereafter across all
markets.  For example, Michael Masters has suggested: “No single
non-commercial entity should ever be allowed to represent more than
5% of a market’s total open interest under any circumstances.”189
Yet, some hope still exists that the position limits, even in their
lax present form, may prove strong enough to dampen speculation
and thus bring down commodity prices, including that of crude oil.
184 See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
185 See, e.g., supra notes 64–71 and accompanying text.
186 Commodity and Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 74-675, ch. 545, sec. 5, § 4a(a), 49 Stat. 1491,
1492 (1936) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a)).
187 Cf. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 737, 124 Stat. 1376, 1723 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6a(a)(3)(B)(iii)) (stating that posi-
tion limits should “ensure sufficient market liquidity for bona fide hedgers”).
188 See Masters 2009 Testimony, supra note 56, at 19.
189 Id. at 5.
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This hope is perhaps most evident in the reaction to the CFTC’s new
position limits rules by the big bank speculators themselves.  On De-
cember 2, 2011, Wall Street-dominated trade associations challenged
the CFTC’s final position limits rule in federal district court.190  The
plaintiffs argued that the Commission had not conducted the required
cost-benefit analysis before enacting the position limits, which they
believe would show that the position limits will decrease market li-
quidity and increase volatility.191  The plaintiffs further noted that the
final position limits rule passed by a mere 3–2 vote, with Commis-
sioner Dunn voting in favor of the rule but stating on the record that
he thought the rule would do more harm than good.192  On September
28, 2012, the plaintiffs prevailed at the district court level, when the
district judge invalidated the position limits rule as not mandated by
Congress under Dodd-Frank.193  The CFTC has decided to appeal this
ruling.194
2. Legislative Ban on Commodity Investment Vehicles
As the CFTC encounters difficulty in substantially limiting exces-
sive speculation under section 737 of Dodd-Frank as Congress in-
tended, Congress should immediately, and on an emergency basis,
enact legislation that bans the use of commodity index swaps and ex-
change traded funds.  These investment vehicles are the most damag-
ing to commodity staples derivatives markets because they are
premised on synthetic bets on commodity futures price directions.
190 See Complaint, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n, No. 1:11-cv-02146 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2011); see also Christopher Doering, Wall St. Sues
CFTC over Commodity Trading Crackdown, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2011, 6:16 PM), www.reuters.
com/article/2011/12/02/us-financial-limits-lawsuit-idUSTRE7B11XJ20111202.
191 See Doering, supra note 190.
192 See Complaint, supra note 190, at 2, 4; see also U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM’N, OPEN MEETING ON TWO FINAL RULE PROPOSALS UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT
12–13 (Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/df-
submission/dfsubmission7_101811-trans.pdf; Asjylyn Loder & Silla Brush, CFTC Votes 3-2 to
Approve Limits on Commodity Speculation, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.business-
week.com//-10-18/cftc-votes-3-2-to-approve-limits-on-commodity-speculation.html; Brian
Scheid, A Position Limits Rule No One Likes, Partisan Fighting, and a Song, PLATTS (Oct. 20,
2011, 12:45PM), http://blogs.platts.com/2011/10/20/a_position_limi/.
193 Tom Schoenberg, CFTC Rule Restraining Speculation Rejected by U.S. Judge, BLOOM-
BERG (Sept. 28, 2012, 4:37 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-28/cftc-rule-re-
straining-speculation-rejected-by-u-s-judge.html.
194 Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Approves Position Limit
Appeal (Nov. 15, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6413-12.
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In this respect, H.R. 5186, the Halt Index Trading of Energy
Commodities Act (“HITEC”),195 introduced by Representative Ed
Markey on April 27, 2012, and co-sponsored by Representatives Bar-
ney Frank and Rosa DeLauro,196 represents a bold and important first
step toward ending excessive speculation in commodities markets.
The bill would prevent commodity index funds that trade in crude oil,
natural gas, or derivatives thereof, from engaging in transactions with
investors who are not bona fide hedgers.197  Importantly, HITEC iden-
tifies commodity index funds as the main cause of speculative activity
in staple commodities markets198 and asserts that speculative activity
has added nearly $1.00 to the per gallon price of gasoline.199  The bill
appears to have already had a significant impact on speculative activ-
ity—oil prices dropped from $105 to $98 per barrel in the days after
the legislation was introduced and within weeks dropped further to
approximately$80.200  This decline mimics the drop from the world re-
cord high of $147 per barrel of crude oil in July 2008 to $30 per barrel
in December 2008201 in the wake of the strong legislative efforts to
curb excessive speculation during the fall of 2008 as discussed
above.202
A comprehensive legislative ban on commodity index swaps and
exchange traded funds would only stop passive betting on the upward
direction of commodity staples, including oil futures.  Those who wish
to place price directional bets will still have other less deleterious in-
vestment avenues to pursue: they can buy or short stocks in compa-
nies that produce the commodities, they can buy the actual
commodities, or they can buy long or short contracts in the futures
markets.  Of course, these alternative and traditional avenues of in-
vestment require financial sophistication.  Using them is not as simple
as walking up to the commodity staples betting window and placing a
195 Halt Index Trading of Energy Commodities Act, H.R. 5186, 112th Cong. (2012).
196 Press Release, H. Comm. on Natural Res., Markey, Frank, DeLauro Go After Wall
Street Oil Inv. Prods. (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://democrats.naturalresources.house.gov/
press-release/markey-frank-delauro-go-after-wall-street-oil-investment-products.
197 See id.
198 H.R. 5186 § 2(3) (“Almost all of this increase in speculation has been caused by a surge
in trading of commodity index funds.”).
199 Id. § 2(7).
200 Petroleum & Other Liquids, EIA, supra note 4.
201 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 149–59 and accompanying text.
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bet with a big Wall Street bank that a basket of synthetic commodities
will rise in value.203
Regulation by individual states may provide another possible
means to prevent excessive speculation because states may now em-
ploy their gaming and bucket-shop laws to regulate commodity index
vehicles and exchange traded funds.  The Commodity Futures Mod-
ernization Act of 2000204 had expressly preempted state gaming and
anti-bucket-shop laws from regulating commodity-based swaps.205
Dodd-Frank eliminated this preemption, however, for swaps that are
not based on securities.206  This allows state regulators to act under
their gaming and anti-bucket shop laws for the first time in many
years to regulate or terminate betting on commodity staples prices,
thus serving as another potential regulatory check on highly specula-
tive and systemically risky “bets” by large U.S. financial institutions.
3. Anti-Manipulation Rules
In light of the weak CFTC position limit rules, anti-manipulation
remedies may prove to be a better route to dampen excessive specula-
tion in the futures markets.  Section 753 of Dodd-Frank directs the
CFTC to enact regulations that prohibit market participants from us-
ing or employing “any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance” to affect commodities prices.207  Also known as the “Cantwell
Amendment,” section 753 enhances the CFTC’s anti-manipulation au-
thority by lowering the standard of proof that the CFTC must satisfy
in order to prove market manipulation.208  Prior to the passage of the
amendment, the CFTC had to prove market manipulation by estab-
lishing, inter alia, that the accused acted with the specific intent to
203 See, e.g., CME GROUP, A TRADER’S GUIDE TO FUTURES 19 (2011), available at http://
www.cmegroup.com/education/files/ED-004_IntroToFuturesBrochure.pdf.
204 Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 200, Pub. L. No. 106-554, app. E, 114 Stat.
2763A-365.
205 Id. § 408(c), 114 Stat. at 2763A-461; see also 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 32, at 975.
206 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 725(g), 767, 124 Stat. 1376, 1685, 1800 (2010) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 27f; 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a))
(removing preemption against covered swap agreements by amending the CEA, while preempt-
ing state and local regulations and prohibitions related to gaming and bucket shops by amending
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
207 Id. sec. 753(a), § 6(c), 124 Stat. at 1750 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 9, 15) (amending the
CEA).
208 See Press Release, Maria Cantwell, U.S. Senator for Wash., Senate Passes Cantwell
Anti-Manipulation Amendment (May 6, 2010), available at http://cantwell.senate.gov/news/re-
cord.cfm?id=324761 (observing that section 753 “strengthen[s the CFTC’s] enforcement powers
over commodity and derivatives trading” and provides the agency with “a more effective legal
tool to enforce prohibitions on market manipulation in futures and derivatives markets”).
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create an artificial price.209  The difficulty of successfully pursuing ac-
tions under this rule is reflected by the fact that the Commission won
only one anti-manipulation case in thirty-five years.210
Under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC may prove manipulation by estab-
lishing that the accused recklessly employed a manipulative scheme to
affect commodity prices.211  As one former CFTC general counsel ex-
plained: “It won’t be a defence to say that you didn’t specifically in-
tend to manipulate the market, if the actions you took were reckless in
having that impact or effect . . . .”212  In this respect, the anti-manipula-
tion authority provided by section 753 offers “a strong and clear legal
standard that allows regulators to successfully go after reckless and
manipulative behavior.”213
The CFTC published its final market manipulation rule on July
14, 2011.214  The rule prohibits the use of “fraud and fraud-based ma-
nipulative devices and contrivances employed intentionally or reck-
lessly, regardless of whether the conduct in question was intended to
create or did create an artificial price.”215  The CFTC defines “reck-
lessness” as “an act or omission that departs so far from the standards
209 See Gary Gensler, Chairman Gensler’s Statements of Support on Five Dodd-Frank Final
Rules, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N (July 7, 2011), http://www.cftc.gov/Press-
Room/SpeechesTestimony/genslerstatement070711b (explaining that “[i]n the past, the
CFTC . . . had to prove the specific intent of the accused to create an artificial price”).  The
Commission was previously required to prove:
(1) that the accused had the ability to influence market prices; (2) that the accused
specifically intended to create or effect a price or price trend that does not reflect
legitimate forces of supply and demand; (3) that artificial prices existed; and
(4) that the accused caused the artificial prices.
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Q & A–ANTI-MANIPU-
LATION AND ANTI-FRAUD FINAL RULES 1, available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/
@newsroom/documents/file/amaf_qa_final.pdf [hereinafter Q&A: ANTI-MANIPULATION RULES].
210 Jamila Trindle, CFTC Expands Its Power to Pursue Fraud, Manipulation, WALL ST. J.
(July 8, 2011), http://.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303544604576431814190513164.html.
211 See Gensler, supra note 209 (“Under the new law and one of the rules before us today,
the Commission’s anti-manipulation reach is extended to prohibit the reckless use of fraud-
based manipulative schemes.  This closes a significant gap, as it will broaden the types of cases
we can pursue and improve the chances of prevailing over wrongdoers.”).
212 Alexander Osipovich, Law and Order, RISK, June 2012, at 19 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
213 Press Release, Maria Cantwell, U.S. Senator for Wash., Federal Regulators Finalize
Tough New Market Manipulation Rule Required by Cantwell (July 7, 2011), available at http://
cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=333423 (internal quotation marks omitted).
214 Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and De-
ceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398 (July 14, 2011)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. § 180) [hereinafter Prohibition on Manipulative Devices]; see also Trindle,
supra note 210.
215 Q&A: ANTI-MANIPULATION RULES, supra note 209.
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of ordinary care that it is very difficult to believe the actor was not
aware of what he or she was doing.”216  Furthermore, proof of knowl-
edge is not required.217  The CFTC’s new scienter standard is in line
with the standard required of other regulatory agencies to prove ma-
nipulation in other markets, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”),218 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”),219 and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).220
The positive effect of anti-manipulation enforcement on excessive
speculation has been evident in the natural gas market.  The pricing
crisis in natural gas led the Republican-controlled Congress to pass
the Energy Policy Act of 2005.221  Since the passage of that Act, FERC
has made stopping market fraud and manipulation in the natural gas
markets “an enforcement priority.”222  It has passed regulations that
ensure market transparency223 and has sought considerable fines from
216 Prohibition on Manipulative Devices, supra note 214, at 41,404 (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
217 Id.
218 A recklessness scienter standard is sufficient for the Securities Exchange Commission to
pursue market manipulation cases under SEC Rule 10b-5, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2011). See, e.g., Graham v. S.E.C., 222 F.3d 994, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2000); S.E.C. v. U.S. Envtl.,
Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1998); cf. Osipovich, supra note 212, at 22 (quoting a former
FERC economist who draws parallels between the more stringent insider trading laws in the
1980s and the new anti-manipulation rules for futures markets).
219 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 315, § 4a, 119 Stat. 594, 691
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1); id. sec. 1283, § 222, 119 Stat. at 979 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 824v).
220 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 811–12, 121
Stat. 1492, 1723–24 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 17301–02).  The FTC has chosen to enforce the
statute under the scienter requirement of “extreme recklessness,” a higher standard than ordi-
nary recklessness, but lower than intent.  Prohibitions on Market Manipulation, 74 Fed. Reg.
40,686, 40,696 (Aug. 12, 2009) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 317).
221 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594; see also Lindsay Renick
Mayer, Big Oil, Big Influence, PBS (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/347/oil-polit-
ics.html; NATURAL GAS REPORT, supra note 119, at 130.  When Representative Graves co-spon-
sored another bill with Representative Barrow in July 2007 to require traders who hold large
positions in the natural gas market to report those positions to the CFTC, he stated that natural
gas prices were “being driven by speculation and manipulation of the market” and that Congress
needed to act to prevent consumers from paying more for natural gas. See Lawmakers See Need
to Put Limits on U.S. Electronic Energy Markets, PUB. POWER WKLY., July 23, 2007, at 5.
222 Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N,
http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/market-manipulation.asp (last visited Jan. 25, 2013); see also
Scott DiSavino & Jonathan Leff, Insight: Energy Regulators in New Push to Quash Manipula-
tion, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2012, 1:58 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article///12/us-regulations-en-
ergy-us-idUSBRE83B06Z20120412.
223 See CLEARY GOTTLIEB, FERC’S NEW FOCUS ON TRANSPARENCY AND PROTECTING
AGAINST MANIPULATION OF NATURAL GAS MARKETS 1–2 (2008), http://www.cgsh.com/files/
News/c30a1328-e321-4d45-a060-5d6a0bf6c3c6/Presentation/NewsAttachment/2c55bc4e-18c3-
4e6e-a3db-6061618857c8/10-2008%20Natural%20Gas%20Alert%2020080117.pdf [hereinafter
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traders who allegedly manipulated natural gas prices.  In 2007, FERC
sought penalties and disgorged profits of over $290 million in connec-
tion with the alleged manipulation of natural gas markets by traders at
Amaranth Advisors LLC.224  FERC settled with Amaranth but contin-
ued proceedings against Brian Hunter, a former Amaranth trader,
eventually fining him $30 million for his involvement in the manipula-
tion scheme.225  In 2011, FERC brought a manipulation case against
Atmos Energy for attempting to avoid FERC’s posting and bidding
requirements in order to create a long-term, noncompetitive dis-
counted rate release.226  Also in 2011, FERC pursued BP for “fraudu-
lently trading physical natural gas” and for trading points in order to
increase the value of its financial positions.227  FERC’s aggressive
stance against manipulation in the natural gas market has helped
bring natural gas prices from record highs of around $15 per million
British thermal units (“BTU”) in 2005 to ten-year lows of less than $2
per million BTU in April 2012.228
CLEARY GOTTLIEB REPORT] (commenting that FERC regulations require a broad range of mar-
ket participants to annually report specified information related to their natural gas trades, such
as the total volume of transactions for the previous year and the volume of transactions priced
according to a particular pricing mechanism); see also Statement of Philip D. Moeller, Comm’r,
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Open Commission Meeting (Apr. 19, 2007), available at http://
.ferc.gov/////04-19-07-moeller-M-1.pdf (“I am confident that the proposed daily postings by the
intrastate carriers will allow the Commission and other market observe[r]s to identify and rem-
edy potentially manipulat[iv]e activity more actively by tracking price movements.”).
224 See CLEARY GOTTLIEB REPORT, supra note 223, at 2; see also John R. Morris, FERC
Changes Its Approach in Two Price Manipulation Cases, ECONOMISTS INK, Dec. 2009, at 2, avail-
able at http://www.ei.com/vieweconink.php?id=238 (explaining that FERC reached a $7.5 million
settlement with Amaranth Advisors LLC after initially pursuing $259 million in civil penalties
and disgorged profits).
225 See Press Release, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, FERC Orders $30 Million Fine
Against Former Amaranth Trader (Apr. 21, 2011), available at http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-
releases/2011/2011-2/04-21-11-G-1.asp (explaining that traders at Amaranth allegedly amassed
large amounts of natural gas futures contracts, which they then sold all at once in order to in-
crease the value of the significantly larger short positions maintained by Amaranth in natural gas
swaps).
226 See STAFF NOTICE OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS, U.S. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMM’N 1–2 n.3 (Aug. 12, 2011), available at http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/alleged-violation/
notices/atmos.pdf (noting alleged violations by Atmost Energy Corp.).
227 See STAFF NOTICE OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS, U.S. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY
COMM’N 1 (July 28, 2011), available at http://www.ferc.gov/enforcement/alleged-violation/notices/
bp-america.pdf (noting alleged violations by BP North America Inc.).
228 Arkansas Natgas Tax Collections Down More than 33%, CITY WIRE (Ft. Smith, Ark.)
(Dec. 19, 2012, 11:14 AM), thecitywire.com/node/25603#.UQMUzqF2EZg; Steve Hargreaves,
Big Oil Sees Energy Bonanza Ahead, CNNMONEY (Dec. 6, 2011, 1:59 PM), http://money.cnn.
com/2011/12/06/news//_gas_supply/index.htm; Dan Strumpf, Natural Gas Slides to 10-Year Low,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504
577311911947295928.html; ; see also Rapier, supra note 11; Ken Silverstein, Oil and Natural Gas
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This experience in the natural gas market demonstrates the effec-
tiveness of regulatory agency enforcement of anti-manipulation rules
in bringing market prices under control.  The CFTC can expect to de-
crease volatility and bring prices under control in the commodity fu-
tures markets in the same way by aggressively pursuing conduct that
violates its new anti-manipulation rules.  Furthermore, FERC’s anti-
manipulation enforcement experience in the natural gas markets sug-
gests that, given the close relationship between the natural gas mar-
kets and the crude oil markets, similar instances of manipulation may
be occurring in the oil futures market as well.
In contrast, the FTC has exercised very little of its authority to
enforce the prohibition against price manipulation of crude oil gaso-
line or petroleum distillates at wholesale, which was granted by Con-
gress through the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.229
The FTC launched a probe in June 2011 to investigate whether oil
companies and refineries have engaged in price fixing,230 but nothing
has emerged from this effort.231
Unlike the FTC, the CFTC has recently aggressively pursued ma-
nipulation cases in the crude oil futures markets under its own anti-
manipulation rules.  In April 2012, the Commission reached a settle-
ment and received $13 million in penalties and $1 million in disgorged
profits from Optiver Holding BV, whose subsidiaries and traders had
allegedly manipulated crude oil, gasoline, and heating oil prices.232
Part Ways, FORBES (May 14, 2012, 10:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein///14/
oil-and-natural-gas-part-ways/ (quoting Valerie Wood, the president of an energy consulting
firm: “I think prices have reached an interim low and therefore some of the speculators are
willing to come back into natural gas . . . .”);.
229 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, §§ 811–15, 121
Stat. 1492, 1723–24.
230 See Ben Geman, FTC Probes Possible Oil Market Manipulation, THE HILL (June 20,
2011, 4:54 PM), http://thehill.com//-wire/-wire/-federal-trade-commission-opens-probe-of-possi-
ble-oil-market-manipulation; Ayesha Rascoe & Roberta Rampton, FTC Probes Possible Oil
Market Manipulation, REUTERS (June 20, 2011, 7:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
06/20/us-oil-ftc-probe-idUSTRE75J6J020110620.
231 See Hall, supra note 173; Roberta Rampton, Democrat Senator Urges FTC to Wrap up
Gasoline Probe, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2012, 12:24 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/
usa-oil-ftc-idUSL2E8E188W20120301; Press Release, Maria Cantwell, U.S. Senator for Wash.,
Cantwell: Won’t Support FTC Nominee Who Doesn’t Aggressively Police Oil Market Manipula-
tion (Dec. 4, 2012), available at www.cantwell.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=a6
7a0ad0-b73c-45e8-a215-b309e6f38b94.
232 See David Sheppard & Jonathan Stempel, High-Frequency Trader Optiver Pays $14 Mil-
lion in Oil Manipulation Case, REUTERS (Apr. 20, 2012, 12:54 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/04/20/us-optiver-settlement-idUSBRE83J01220120420.  The defendants had alleg-
edly been involved in a manipulative tactic called “banging the close,” which involves “acquiring
a substantial position leading up to the closing period, followed by taking offsetting positions in a
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In May 2011, the Commission charged Parnon Energy and its af-
filiates with pursuing an oil manipulation scheme in 2008 that resulted
in profits of $50 million.233  Two traders from the company had alleg-
edly amassed very large positions in the Cushing, Oklahoma physical
market in order to create the impression of a shortage and to push up
the price of WTI futures on NYMEX.234  The traders made money by
purchasing futures that would profit from the rise in price.235  The
judge in the federal case has denied a motion to dismiss.236
Notably, the CFTC pursued its actions against Optiver and
Parnon Energy under the old manipulation rules which required a
showing of the defendants’ intent.237  Thus, the new anti-manipulation
rules should enable the Commission to bring many more actions with
an even greater record of success.238
The Commission has demonstrated through these cases (along
with its widely publicized anti-manipulation investigations of LIBOR
interest rates)239 that it is more than willing to combat manipulation in
commodity staples markets, including crude oil.  However, Wall Street
manner intended to push prices in the manipulator’s favor.”  Press Release, Commodity Futures
Trading Comm’n, Federal Court Orders $14 Million in Fines and Disgorgement Stemming from
CFTC Charges Against Optiver and Others for Manipulation of NYMEX Crude Oil, Heating
Oil, and Gasoline Futures Contracts and Making False Statements (Apr. 19, 2012), available at
http://www.cftc.gov///-12.
233 Jack Farchy & Javier Blas, CFTC Charges Traders over Oil Price, FIN. TIMES, May 25,
2011, at 1.
234 Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief and Civil Monetary Penalties
Under the Commodity Exchange Act at 2, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Parnon
Energy, Inc., No. 1:11-cv-3543 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2011) [hereinafter Parnon Complaint], availa-
ble at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/.
pdf; see also Farchy & Blas, supra note 233, at 1; Ayesha Rascoe & Christopher Doering, CFTC
Charges Arcadia, Oil Traders with Manipulation, REUTERS (May 24, 2011, 4:13 PM), http://www.
reuters.com///05/24/us-cftc-oil-manipulation-idUSTRE74N6S720110524.
235 See Parnon Complaint, supra note 234, at 2.
236 See Bob Van Voris, Parnon, Arcadia Loses Bid Dismiss Oil Manipulation Case, BLOOM-
BERGBUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-04-26/parnon-ar-
cadia-loses-bid-dismiss-oil-manipulation-case.
237 Cf. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief and Civil Monetary Penalties
Under the Commodity Exchange Act at 18, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Op-
tiver US, LLC, No. 08-cv-6560 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2008), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/
groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/.pdf (noting that many of the de-
fendants’ conversations “reflect[ed] their manipulative intent”); Parnon Complaint, supra note
234, at 11 (“[Defendants] intended to and did acquire a dominant [position] . . . .”).
238 See supra notes 211–16.
239 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders
Barclays to Pay $200 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting Con-
cerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest Rates (June 27, 2012), available at http://www.
cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12.
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and Republican opposition to its mission has created difficulties for
the CFTC in exercising its full authority, due to a tremendous defi-
ciency in sufficient resources to oversee the $300 trillion notional
value futures and swaps markets now under its jurisdiction after the
passage of Dodd-Frank.240  In this light, President Obama’s strategy of
deploying an interagency task force led by the Department of Justice
presents the best chance to address manipulation in the crude oil fu-
tures markets.241  This interagency task force combines the expertise
of the understaffed CFTC along with the vast investigatory resources
of the Department of Justice.242  Just as FERC uncovered manipula-
tion in the natural gas markets, this combination of the CFTC and the
Department of Justice, if pursued aggressively, should uncover and
turn back manipulation in the crude oil futures markets, thereby driv-
ing down the price of crude oil to a point consistent with market
fundamentals.
CONCLUSION
A wide range of experts, observers, and market participants make
it clear that speculation in the oil futures markets exceeds what is re-
quired for proper liquidity, and that this excessive speculation has led
to overwhelming volatility in oil prices, often driving the price of a
barrel of crude oil $25 to $30 above what market fundamentals dic-
tate.  It is widely understood that increasing volatility increases the
expense for producers and consumers of using futures as a hedge.  If
commercial interests cannot hedge in a fair and orderly market, they
and their ultimate consumers (the public at large) are left to the mercy
of volatile markets that undercut the hedging function.
Position limits and other enforcement mechanisms are necessary
in commodities of finite supply to curb excessive speculation.  The
current CFTC position limit rules should therefore be strengthened
and strictly enforced, and the CFTC must take advantage of the new
anti-manipulation rules that empower it to pursue more strongly those
futures market speculators who cause the price of oil and other com-
modities to become unmoored from economic fundamentals.
240 See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2011-2015, at 3
(2011); Testimony of Michael Greenberger, supra note 70, at 7–8; Bruce Edwards, Op-Ed, Tak-
ing Aim at Speculators, RUTLAND HERALD (Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.rutlandherald.com/arti-
cle/20120311/BUSINESS03/703119968/0/OPINION03.
241 See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text. But see Hall, supra note 173.
242 See Hall, supra note 173.
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The enforcement of strong position limits and other rules that
limit excessive speculation has no meaningful adverse effect on the
real economy.  Position limits are designed to permit sufficient specu-
lation to provide liquidity to commercial users of derivatives markets.
They also limit the scope of placing bets for gambling’s sake on up-
ward price movements of energy and food staples worldwide.  Stop-
ping excessive gambling will not undercut production of commodities
one whit because passive betting does not provide any assistance to
the production of those commodities.  The cost benefit analysis here is
quite simple.  By stopping unproductive gambling by passive investors
and institutions that exceeds the provision of liquidity, consumers in
the U.S. and worldwide will pay fairer, lower, and market-driven
prices for their everyday needs.
